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Long-term Assistance and Services for Research (LASER)
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Somalia Resilience Food Security Activities: A Political Economy Analysis

SUPPLEMENT TO AGREEMENT NO. AID-7200AA18CA00009
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ABOUT THE PROJECT

This Political Economy Analysis (PEA), produced in parallel with a Desk Research and Market Study (DRMS), is one of the BHA/TPQ/SPADe Somalia RFSA Design project's deliverables. The research undertaken under this project will inform the design of a future multi-year Resilience and Food Security Activity (RFSA) in Somalia. The project is supported via a buy-in from USAID's BHA/TPQ/SPADe into the Long-Term Assistance and Services for Research (LASER) Project currently in place between USAID/DDI/ITR/R and Purdue University under a cooperative agreement # 7200AA18CA00009. The BHA/TPQ/SPADe Somalia RFSA Activity Design project has been executed by Consilient Research under a sub-contract with Purdue University.

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ABOUT LASER PULSE

LASER (Long-term Assistance and Services for Research) PULSE (Partners for University-Led Solutions Engine) is a $70 million program funded through USAID's Innovation, Technology, and Research Hub, that delivers research-driven solutions to field-sourced development challenges in USAID partner countries.

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ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
DRMS	Desk Review and Market Study
FGD	Focused group discussion
FMS	Federal Member State
HSS	Hirshabelle State
IDP	Internally displaced persons
JSS	Jubaland State
JUCRI	Jubaland Commission for Refugees and IDPs
KII	Key informant interviews
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
RFSA	Resilience and Food Security Activity
SLGs	Saving and loans groups
SWS	South West State

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"What is important is to have your clan member in the field to assist you, not your degrees, qualifications, or experiences. If you have family members [from the same clan] who are already employed in that field, your chances of finding employment will be very good. Those without family [clan] members working in business or government are disadvantaged and unable to obtain even minimum wage jobs."[1]

PURPOSE

The purpose of the Political Economy Analysis (PEA) is to provide USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance and potential implementing partners with contextual knowledge of the study's districts and inform their decisions related to an anticipated Resilience Food Security Activity (RFSA) in Somalia. In line with these objectives, this PEA examines the socio-political mechanisms that shape the resilience and marginalization of disadvantaged groups in south-central Somalia, with a special emphasis on internally displaced peoples (IDPs). The PEA aims to be a point of reference for organizations designing and implementing interventions around food security and resilience through USAID's Graduation Approach, enabling them to understand the highly politicized social environments their resources will both shape and be shaped by.

CONTEXT

The research for this PEA was conducted in south-central Somalia, one of the most unstable regions of a country that has been without a fully functioning state for over 30 years. Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somali society has experienced repeated waves of conflict and famine or near-famine conditions. This pattern continues to the present day with an escalation in fighting ongoing at the time of writing, coupled with several years of severe drought conditions, which have been followed by extensive flooding during the final quarter of 2023. One significant consequence of Somalia's decade-long political instability and the resulting institutional incapacity to strengthen communities against environmental challenges has been the continued internal displacement of Somali people. Between 2017 and 2022, the total number of displaced people in Somalia has increased from an estimated 825,000 to a peak of 3.9 million people.[2] The experience of displacement, marginalization, and hunger in Somalia is directly linked to clan identity and its shaping of the political economy of resource distribution. This report analyzes how these mechanisms play out in the districts of Afgoye, Baidoa, Hudur, Jowhar, Kismayo, and Mogadishu.

KEY FINDINGS

The Central Role of Social Capital. Informal social capital is critical for accessing income, land, food, and humanitarian aid. Importantly, commercial food appears largely available across the study sites, but access to income is shaped by social connections, and the data demonstrates how this is heavily informed by clan-based affiliations and the local political dynamics of clan power. Furthermore,

[1] KII 211. (Women's Group Leader). Baidoa.

[2] Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, "Country Profile - Somalia", *IDMC, Accessed January 15th, 2024. https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/somalia#:~:text=Nearly%203.9%20million%20people%20were,data%20became%20available%20in%202009.*

influential clan elders and family relations act as important referees and guarantors for people who aspire to obtain professional jobs, access business credit, and buy and rent land/or enforce their land rights—all of which are critical resources that shape food access.

Disrupted Social Networks due to Displacement. IDPs and other disadvantaged groups are largely excluded from influential social networks and have very weak social capital in the districts under study. This directly impinges on their ability to access work, income, and food, as well as humanitarian aid. They are also often removed from the social networks that provide social support in their places of origin. Displacement severely undermines opportunities they could have accessed through acquaintances, family, or clan elders – increasing their risk of food insecurity in the districts to which they were displaced.

The Precarity of Land Tenure and Aid. Land and humanitarian aid are often used to exploit IDPs. There are many indications across the study area that local landlords, camp leaders, and local governments profit from the vulnerability of IDPs rather than bolster their resilience. For instance, displaced people can be used to attract legitimate aid supplies, which are then claimed as rent for land that IDPs occupy, diverted to other communities, or sold off commercially. The IDP settlements can also be used to increase the value of land, which is then sold and the people evicted once the property value appreciates sufficiently.

Mitigation Initiatives. There are efforts to mitigate the dynamics of aid diversion and land insecurity. However, for this to be successful, the long-term support of local authorities is critical. For example, in Hudur and Kismayo, government agencies are making efforts to regulate and arbitrate land tenure agreements and build the capacities of camp authorities to mediate disputes and manage resource allocation more equitably. In Baidoa and Kismayo, projects are also underway to relocate IDPs to publicly owned land and give them ownership over plots.

IMPLICATIONS

The PEA suggests three general considerations for RFSA programs.

Systematic Identification of Vulnerable Community Members. Reliance on local officials, community leaders, or camp authorities alone to inform aid targeting risks excluding those who are the most vulnerable. Triangulating this information with other sources, such as house-to-house visits and household surveys, may help ensure more accurate targeting of beneficiaries.

Engaging Other Vulnerable Populations. A common narrative emerging from host communities is that aid provision often overlooks the most vulnerable host community members. Consequently, during the initial community profiling and assessment exercises, it may be helpful to identify host households that could also benefit from forms of assistance, even if not at the scale of intensity as displaced populations. Doing so can bolster general community resilience and reduce incentives for aid capture and diversion.

Land Tenure and Rights are Integral to Resilience. The lack of secure land tenure agreements has significant implications for the food security of households. For example, the possibility of being evicted deters many from making longer-term investments in productive assets in the places they relocate to. As a result, programs seeking to foster the food security and resilience of displaced populations would likely be most effective when undertaken with interventions around securing housing, land, and property rights for IDPs and marginalized groups.

1. INTRODUCTION



Figure 1 : Districts of Study for the PEA. Image from: Madden & Zhangalova 2023, Market Study

The overall purpose of the following political economy analysis (PEA) study is to enable implementing partners to think politically when designing RFSAs in Somalia. The PEA details how access to resources is shaped by the informal structures of clan-based social capital across six districts where RFSAs may be implemented: Afgoye, Baidoa, and Hudur in South West State; Jowhar in Hirshabelle; Kismayo in Jubaland; and Mogadishu, the national capital region. In doing so, the study seeks to examine the mechanisms that can prejudice and promote access to income, humanitarian aid, and land, and directly impact the food security of the most marginalized populations in the country. The study invites implementing partners to operationalize this knowledge, and creatively and proactively design politically informed RFSAs that will promote the long-term food security and sustained resilience of the most vulnerable Somalis.

This PEA has several study objectives. The study seeks to examine:

- The political-economic dynamics in the districts of interest in Somalia and how they influence patterns of vulnerability and chronic food and nutrition insecurity;
- How governance, political instability, and conflict impact the resilience of local populations;
- The patterns and causes of the conflict;
- The interests and behavior of key actors and institutions.

The political economy of a war-affected country like Somalia is inherently complex, and a full in-depth examination of the political economy of major urban areas is far beyond the scope of this report.[3] This study provides an overview of such topics but focuses more narrowly on how these political economy dynamics hinder the ability of many marginalized and displaced groups to be food secure. The report presents findings that corroborate much of extant research, while also detailing important district-level dynamics that affect the food security of marginalized groups. For readers seeking more details on particular aspects of Somalia's political economy, the research team encourages them to peruse the references cited, and the accompanying Annotated Bibliography published separately from the PEA.

This study collected qualitative data from various social actors across the six districts. Through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, this PEA focuses primarily on understanding the social processes that inform the vulnerability of internally displaced persons (IDP) and other disadvantaged communities, with questions examining access to food, income, land, power, and the governance structures informing these. The PEA further contextualizes the qualitative data through district mapping exercises to understand district-level clan dynamics and an extensive literature review. In total, the research team conducted 160 key informant interviews and 44 focus group discussions with a broad array of stakeholders, including clan elders, government officials, IDP camp leaders, host

[3] For an excellent overview of the overall context, see Christian Webersik et al., *Somalia: A Political Economy Analysis.* (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2018).

communities, women and youth organization leaders, and displaced populations. Annexes 1 through 3 and 5 provide more details on the methodology and the results of the clan mappings.

The findings of the PEA are divided into two parts. The first presents the overarching findings that are relevant to all the districts of study and lays out the analytical framework for assessing district-level dynamics. It begins with an introduction to the Somalia context, an explanation of why individuals' social capital[4] to kin networks are critical in this context, as well as how these mechanisms shape access to income and resources. The remainder of the first part explores why particular populations are marginalized, namely: IDPs, women, people living with disabilities, and youth. In particular, the report found that competition for land means that IDPs' rights to occupy land they do not own are largely unprotected, often leading to additional vulnerabilities, such as food insecurity. The second part then examines how these dynamics unfold in the districts where USAID's Resilience Food Security Activity (RFSA) will be implemented. In doing so, we also highlight cases where marginalized and displaced populations can mitigate the precarity of their situation, and suggest the factors that enabled them to do so.

2. FINDINGS

2.1. Cross-Cutting Findings

2.1.1. Somalia context: State weakness and the importance of clan connections

Decades of chronic conflict and instability have afflicted Somalia since the latter years of the Siad Barre regime, which collapsed in 1991. Since 2006, the *Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahadeen* insurgency, hereafter referred to as al-Shabaab, has been a significant impediment to state-building processes. Much of Somalia, including the capital city of Mogadishu, was liberated from al-Shabaab occupation only after 2009 with the assistance of foreign military forces from the African Union. While government control of major urban areas is largely secure, al-Shabaab's continued presence renders large swathes of rural territories beyond the state's control, and many government services and economic activities are concentrated in urban, accessible towns.

Internecine conflicts between clans have also stymied the development of state institutions' capability to service citizens. In Somalia, the clan remains a central means of organizing social and political life and is often the primary group or identity category that Somalis affiliate with. Clan networks and clan elders are an important source of social and economic support for in-group members, and, in times of conflict, a source of protection. Besides the ongoing fight against al-Shabaab, conflicts between clan groups and clan militias are common in much of south-central Somalia.

The continued importance of clan structures shapes much of political life, which is still structured around the idea of the "4.5 formula" for power sharing.[5] The term was originally coined to refer to the allocation of full shares of political representation to Somalia's four major clan families—the Hawiye, Darood, Dir, and Rahanweyn—while the remaining "minority" clans are allocated half shares. Since then, it has come more broadly to mean the dominance of certain clans over others, in both the national

[4] Please see Annex 4 for a definition of social capital.

[5] Alex de Waal. "Somalia's Disassembled State: Clan Unit Formation and the Political Marketplace." *Conflict, Security & Development* 20, no. 5 (2020): 561–585.

and local contexts.[6] The institutionalization of clan power sharing in Somalia's governance system has meant that state institutions are often beholden to clan interests. This leads to services and public goods being prioritized for the kin of the key decision-makers, rather than equitably provided to ensure the collective welfare of citizens.

In recent years, these dynamics have converged to create considerable challenges for effective governance, especially in the locations of study. Continued conflicts between government forces and al-Shabaab, and occasionally, clan conflicts, have displaced large numbers of people from their places of origin. In addition, Somalia's climate, worsened by climate change in recent years, renders the country prone to severe droughts, with the most recent drought in 2022 being the most severe the country has experienced in four decades. The absence of effective governance institutions in rural areas has meant that local communities have not been able to cope with such adverse shocks. Continued conflict and environmental shocks have combined to drive large numbers of IDPs to seek refuge elsewhere. Currently, nearly 4 million of Somalia's population of 17 million are estimated to be displaced populations.[7]

A critical dimension of these displacement patterns is that IDP populations tend to converge on large urban centers, which are often the sites of more economic opportunities, and where a heavier presence of Somali and African Union security forces creates a more secure environment to resettle. In Kismayo City, the total square hectares occupied by IDP settlements grew seven-fold between 2013 and 2017; in Baidoa City, the total area grew six-fold up to 2020.[8] As of 2020, 75 percent of IDP settlements were in urban or peri-urban areas, with this number likely having increased since then.[9] Indeed, for many urban areas, IDP arrivals far outpace natural population growth, and displacement is the leading source of urbanization in the country. One study estimates that Somalia is expected to become a predominantly urban population by 2026, in large part because of these dynamics.[10] It is important to note that these growing IDP areas are often haphazardly planned – if planned at all. Urban planning efforts and the expansion of service delivery capacities have often not kept pace with the growth in these urban sprawls. Consequently, rapid population growth due to displacement severely strains the state's already weak governance and service delivery capacities in urban locations.

[6] Indeed, research respondents (including in this study) often use the term "4.5 power sharing" to refer more generally to the fact that political power is concentrated and divided among the most powerful clans in a given area. Applied to the local district level, the term may be analytically misleading in that some of the four major clans referred to in the national-level formula may be minorities or marginalized in a given district, even if they constitute one of the major clan families at the national level. This is the case with, for example, Baidoa, where the clans in the Hawiye and Darood families – among the most powerful elsewhere in Somalia – are considerably weaker and less numerous in Baidoa district. Where respondents cite the "4.5 formula" in this study, the reader should assume that they are citing the more general phenomenon of majority clan political power and minority clan marginalization, unless otherwise indicated.

[7] International Organization for Migration. "Displacement in Somalia Reaches Record High 3.8 Million: IOM Deputy Director General Calls for Sustainable Solutions", International Organization for Migration (28 February, 2023). Retrieved from: https://www.iom.int/news/displacement-somalia-reaches-record-high-38-million-iom-deputy-director-general-calls-sustainable-solutions

[8] World Bank Group. *Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development*. Washington D.C: World Bank Group. 2020, 36 - 40.

[9] Ibid, 36

[10] Dyfed Aubrey and Luciana Cardoso. *Towards Sustainable Urban Development in Somalia and IDP Durable Solutions at Scale*. (Nairobi: UN-Habitat. 2019), 6. For an overview of the urban dynamics of increased displacements, see also Abdullahi Boru Halakhe and Sarah Miller, *No Going Back: The New Urban Face of Internal Displacement in Somalia,* Refugees International, 2023.



Figure 2: An illustration of the growth of Baidoa town's urban IDP Settlements. Credit: Ali, Tonnarelli, and Fernandez. 2020.

One crucial element of the state's inability to provide public goods is the nascent nature of Somalia's statutory legal system, which is tasked with enforcing contracts and protecting citizens' rights. This system is frequently considered being ineffective in resolving disputes, delivering fair verdicts, and enforcing case outcomes.[11] This is partly because of shortcomings in the legal system's technical capacities, including the lack of training or documented protocols for the storing, gathering, and presenting of evidence. These factors have resulted in long case processing times and hefty legal fees for court users, which often deter the most marginalized from using the courts from the beginning. A larger problem, however, is that rulings and enforcement of rulings are often not partial. In Mogadishu, there are accounts that the enforcement of rulings will depend on the security forces' clan and social relationships with parties in a case, and whether enforcement would be in their interest. At times, an "enforcement tax" is levied before security actors take action, clearly privileging those with the means to purchase security.[12]

These accounts are consistent with the broader literature on Somalia's state security forces, which are often said to be a kaleidoscopic mix of various clan militias and groups whose loyalty to their kin can supersede their official mandates.[13] Many of the militias and non-state armed groups that helped reclaim urban centers from al-Shabaab in the late 2000s and early 2010s were subsequently integrated into the national armed forces or local security forces. For instance, the *Raas Kambooni* Darood militias that retook control of Jubaland from al-Shabaab have since become part of the Federal Member State's (FMS) security forces.[14]

Recent additional research in the Kismayo and Baidoa districts highlighted one possible mechanism perpetuating clan loyalties among security forces. It is a common practice for applicants seeking to join the police force to have a reputed clan elder from the community endorse their candidacy and act as "guarantors." This often creates a feeling of reciprocal obligation to these clan elders, and the broader clan groups they represent: the study found that 70.1 percent of police in Baidoa, and 33.1 percent in

[11] Saferworld. The Missing Link: Access to Justice and Community Security in Somalia. London: Saferworld, 2020, 3 – 8.

[12] Robin Mydlak. *Access to Justice Assessment Tool: Baseline Study in Somalia 2020.* Nairobi: Expanding Access to Justice Program. 2020, 85.

[13] Paul D. Williams. "Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a Failure, 2008-2018." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43, no. 3 (2020): 366–391.; Feldab Brown 2020; Vanda Feldab-Brown. "The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone Wants Them Despite Their Dangers." In Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace: How Militias and Paramilitary Groups Shape Post-Conflict Transitions, edited by Adam Day, 112-156. New York: United Nations University, 2020.

[14] Joanne Crouch and Olivier Chevreau, *Forging Jubaland: Community Perspectives on Federalism, Governance, and Reconciliation*. (Nairobi: Saferworld, 2016), 4.

Kismayo, anticipated facing social sanction from their clan if they failed to assist their kin as police officers.[15]

One consequence of the weakness of the state's courts is that the clan-based *xeer* customary system for resolving disputes remains preeminent, and likely more frequently used by community members. The *xeer* is not a unified legal framework, but a loose and mostly undocumented set of norms and precedents that are often specific to a location and the relationship between pairs of clans embroiled in a dispute. The foundational premise of the *xeer* is that the broader clan group must collectively take responsibility for the transgression of one of its members, including by pooling resources to compensate the family of a victim.[16] Though these mechanisms offer an alternative means of resolving disputes outside of state institutions, they are primarily meant to ensure that collective peace is maintained between the disputants' groups, rather than upholding the individual rights of aggrieved parties. The enforcement of rulings is largely based on the social standing and status of the clan elders overseeing a dispute, and, where necessary, the threat of violence from a clan militia or the security forces.[17] Seen in this light, those who are better connected to the majority or powerful clans are likelier to find favorable outcomes compared to those who are less well-connected and are likelier to have outcomes enforced effectively.

In this context of resource scarcity, strained government capacities, and partial enforcement of rights, the importance of social ties to clan networks cannot be overstated. The next section describes the mechanisms by which clan connections to locally dominant clan networks can significantly increase one's ability to obtain critical resources, such as income, employment, and humanitarian assistance, all of which play a critical role in food security and resilience.

2.1.2. Social Capital and Resilience

The significance of social networks—in particular relation to the resilience of communities—in the Somali context is identified in other research.[18] Maxwell et al.,[19] argue the ability to operationalize social relations for support across different scales was one of the most critical factors aiding survival. In their model, effective connectedness is found to move outward from the immediate to the extended, and then the distant social circles. This PEA study does not question that model, but across the districts, the data reflects how immediate social networks are the ones that fundamentally shape access to food and the vulnerability of communities in their everyday lives. Furthermore, the respondents explained how both displacement and systems of clan privilege mean IDP social networks become disconnected and blocked from significant and steady access to local resource flows in their new locations. Indeed, of the IDPs surveyed as part of the DRMS study undertaken in parallel with the PEA, only 13 percent of IDPs claimed they chose to relocate to the district in which they were surveyed because they already had family, clan, or other social connections, suggesting that displacement often entails the complete

[15] UNOPS. Somalia Security and Justice Programme II Design Research [Unpublished Report], 2021.

[16] In practice, smaller units of organization within the clan would be the ones responsible for collectively bearing responsibility for the transgressions of a member. The most basic and smallest unit is the *mag,* or *diya,* paying group. The terms diya (Arabic) and *mag* (Somali) refer to the blood money that groups would need to pay to a family's victim. Thus, it is often at this unit that collective resources are pooled, and cases are adjudicated. See Joakim Gundel, *The predicament of the 'Oday': The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law, and development in Somalia.* (Nairobi: Danish Refugee Council and Novib Oxfam, 2006), 6

[17] Mydlak 2020, Access to Justice, 88

[18] Charles Lwanga-Ntale and Owino Boniface "Understanding Vulnerability and Resilience in Somalia." (Jamba - Journal of Disaster Risk Studies 12, no. 1, 2020), 1–9.

[19] Daniel Maxwell et al. "Facing Famine: Somali Experiences in the Famine of 2011." *Food Policy* 65, 2013, 63–73.

removal of individuals and families from their preexisting social networks. The impact of this cuts across income generation, access to land, and humanitarian aid, thus prolonging marginalization and eroding resilience and food security.

Connections, Income, and Food

In the research, a fundamental feature of the social networks where income and resources are contained is their clan-based nature, with one respondent noting that ""Things in this country are clan-based so a lot of opportunities are given out based on that. IDP people won't be able to know whether a job is available or not and they won't be hired even if they know because they are not from the community and have no connections." [21] This is especially relevant for public authority employment, but it is also referenced for better-paying opportunities in NGOs and businesses. Respondents describe how clan connections still shape political and civil service appointments at the district level, and how the concept can also filter into the employment ratios of private companies and NGOs, partly due to needing guarantors or sponsors who can vouch for a community member seeking employment, effectively agreeing to be responsible for any wrongdoing on the part of the referred person. In the Somali context, this is commonly known as *damiin.*[22]

This is then operationalized through personal relationships, and having access to the influential clan elders or family members who can act as authoritative mediators or referees. Marginalized and IDP communities often lack access to these individuals, or the social or economic capital needed to access this work. They are often left to compete over menial insecure employment where clan contacts are less important. Indeed, a recent quantitative study of IDPs across Baidoa, Kismayo, and Mogadishu found that wage or casual labor is the primary source of income for IDPs,[23] a finding further corroborated by our qualitative data. Casual labor opportunities usually require less advanced skill sets, hence they are more accessible to IDP and other marginalized populations. However, since they are non-salaried positions, work opportunities are inconsistent, low-paying, and often physically tiresome, such as work transporting goods using wheelbarrows or construction works. The unpredictability of income from casual labor means that it is often not sufficient for IDPs to meet basic needs consistently, let alone invest in productive assets.

This has direct implications for access to food. Across the study, respondents stated that even when food supplies are available in their districts, an inability to purchase foods that are already in a town's marketplace is often the major barrier to food access. However, sourcing a secure job with steady living wages is rare among IDPs and, indeed, host communities across all districts. Furthermore, IDP respondents describe being further disadvantaged because they have been dislocated from sources of social support in their places of origin, and they lack avenues to pursue training and education that could foster better income-generating opportunities in the urban environment. The importance of social connection for job opportunities is also relevant for marginalized host communities, who often face a very challenging informal job market where future income is never guaranteed. This, combined with

[21] KII 323. (Business Leader). Jowhar.

[22] Juliette Syn and Laura Cunial. "Who Are You?" Linkages Between Legal Identity and Housing, Land, and Property Rights in Somalia. Mogadishu: Norwegian Refugee Council. 2022, 40.

[23] Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat. *Listening to Displacement Affected Communities Over Time: Understanding Intentions and Aspirations in Support of Durable Solutions*. Mogadishu: ReDSS, 2022, 30. It is worth noting that casual labor is also the primary means of sustenance for host communities in the survey, but the broader point of the precarity of IDPs livelihoods options remains true.

high prices on largely imported food, results in a reality where food insecurity is the norm for displaced and marginalized peoples.[24]

Connections, Income, and Land

Respondents explained that land is commercially available across the research sites. The clan-based factors that shape access to income and food, also influence people's ability to rent and own productive land. One respondent explains that "I can't access land because all of these farms are owned by the host community, and I can't go back to my lands due to the conflicts going on. I can find rental farms in Jowhar district, but I can't afford to pay the rent."[26] Thus, land, like other significant resources, has cultural value connected to belonging and power. Some respondents said land access is also affected by clan affiliation and trust, with landowners wary of tenants claiming ownership after using land over long periods.

Aid, Relationships, and Clan

Relationships are often highlighted as key factors in accessing aid. This includes those of the camp authorities both externally to the local authority and aid providers, and internally to the camp residents. However, the distribution of humanitarian aid flows through a wide network of actors, all taking on significant roles regarding the advocacy for and selection of the communities and individuals who will benefit. This includes the public administration, local NGO actors, and community and camp-level governance structures. Some respondents explained that clan networks are still influential here, as public authorities may prioritize their familiar clan-based constituencies for assistance, whereas marginalized and IDP communities have far less representation in distribution networks.

> *"When relief organizations arrive in this region, they will ask the government to choose the recipients, and the government officials tasked with doing so will choose people from their own clan or people they are familiar with – making it more difficult and challenging for people to receive food equally…communities have distinct problems since some communities have members of their own clan who are government officials assigned to choose them, while other communities have no representatives in the system."*[27]

Furthermore, the personal relationships camp residents build with camp leaders and authorities, commonly referred to as "gatekeepers" by humanitarian agencies, can also determine who is registered as a beneficiary. It is important to emphasize that the role of gatekeepers needs to be considered with nuance. While they often have a negative reputation among humanitarian agencies because of their taking of aid intended for the most vulnerable—a practice which this PEA also documents—those dependent on such actors sometimes view them in a positive, even an affectionate light, as these same figures are also often responsible for advocating on behalf of IDP communities in their camps and for providing important services, such as dispute resolution. Nonetheless, aid as a relatively scarce but

[24] The parallel DRMS study offers rich details on the degree of food availability and access. See Payce Madden and Ayazhan Zhangalova. BHA/TPQ/SPADe Somalia RFSA Activity Design Project

Desk Review and Market Study. (West Lafayette, IN: Long-term Assistance and Services for Research - Partners for University-Led Solutions Engine (LASER PULSE): 2023).

[26] KII 307. (Clan Elder Minority). Jowhar.

[27] FGD 230. (Female Host Community). Baidoa.

significant and highly sought-after resource embeds power in the hands of those able to advocate for and select beneficiaries.

Trust, Relationships, and Resources

"The members of the IDP communities have two categories. …Those who are from resident clans can get job opportunities in the district …by the support of their clan elders and close relatives who influence the institutions, but for those who are from far away regions like Bay, no one is going to trust them to give them those positions."[28]

Trust emerges as a smaller but consistent theme across the research. Respondents describe how trust can affect access to employment, access to land, and the ability to secure forms of credit for both business ventures and emergency food supplies from stores. Trust emerges from perceptions of belonging, and family, community, and clan relations, alongside having respected family members and clan elders as referees. In Somalia, the limited reach of institutions means these more localized, less formal, and potentially less neutral structures can mitigate risk. Individuals, such as IDPs, who are unknown entities locally and have no visible collateral, are not trusted with resources. In this regard, while clan and family networks prejudice the flow of resources, they are also some of the few local institutions capable of providing the trust needed for all types of economic transactions.

2.1.3. Land and the Political Economy of Displacement

The previous section highlighted the importance of social capital in accessing the resources that are important to resilience outcomes. As populations that lack appropriate social networks, or were dislodged from their pre-displacement ones, marginalized and displaced populations face tremendous challenges in gaining food security. Another crucial dimension of the marginalization of IDP communities is the importance of land as an economic and political resource, and how regulating IDP access to land creates a displacement industry that perpetuates IDPs' marginalization. Lacking the social capital to find recourse to justice and protection, IDPs are often highly vulnerable to the economic interests entrenched in regulating displacement.

Land is a highly valuable commodity in Somalia. As much of Somalia is arid or semi-arid, cultivable land with access to water sources and pasture is highly sought after by agro-pastoralist populations. As industry and economic activities in Somalia also tend to concentrate in urban settings such as Mogadishu and Baidoa, and because expansion outside of urban and peri-urban areas is limited due to continued insecurity, urban land is also a highly lucrative investment for businesses and landowners. These dynamics have led to land values in urban and peri-urban areas skyrocketing over the past decade, further intensifying competition.[29]

Despite the centrality of land to the economy, regulation of land use in Somalia is largely ineffective due to ongoing conflicts and a weak statutory legal system. Written land title deeds and agreements are often lost,[30] if they were ever written to begin with, and forged documentation claiming land rights are rampant, which leads to general skepticism of *any* documentation presented as proof of land ownership. Government agencies' ability to track and plot land boundaries is limited, rendering the

[28] KII 518. (Women's Group Leader). Mogadishu.

[29] For an overview of land conflicts in Somalia, see also Rift Valley Institute. Land Conflict in Somalia: Key Issues and Challenges for Transformation. Nairobi, Kenya: Somalia Stability Fund, 2021.

[30] Ken Menkhaus, *Dadaab Returnee Conflict Assessment*. Mogadishu: Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat, 2017, 18

adjudication of land claims challenging. For these reasons, competition over land is often fierce and is one of the main drivers of conflict in many areas.

In this context of fierce competition over land, IDPs often cannot secure their lands when they are displaced into a new community in which they have few social connections. In rare cases, IDPs may be resettled into public lands with protection of their rights from government agencies. Two notable examples of this occurred in Kismayo and Baidoa, which this report will later document, under the framework of Somalia's National Durable Solutions Strategy.[31] Nonetheless, most IDPs either rent from existing landowners or squat on land whose ownership status is often unclear. In the latter case, the informal nature of their occupancy leaves IDPs vulnerable to land-grabbing attempts and forced evictions by businesspeople, host community members, or even other IDPs. However, even in the former case, land tenure is often tenuous. As seen throughout the district-specific sections, arrangements of occupying land and paying rent to landowners are fraught with risks, as many are not formalized with an agreement detailing tenure length, rental amounts, and other vital information. Sometimes, there is only a verbal agreement, which leaves many IDPs beholden to the whims of the landowner, who have the power to evict the IDPs at any time owing to a lack of binding, provable agreements.

Extant research highlights the incentives driving landowners' behaviors towards IDPs. Many are aware that having IDPs settle their land increases the likelihood of humanitarian assistance being distributed to these locations, of which landowners often demand a share from the IDP beneficiaries in exchange for continued occupancy of their land. Other camp authorities, such as camp leaders, are also known to demand shares of incoming aid in exchange for continued services for IDPs. As one IDP explains:

"We give part of the food aid to the person whose land we live on because he says that he does not have income and I live here. We divide the food and cards that are brought into two parts – they take one part, and we take the other part. … I give part of the food aid to the owner of the camp because he is the one who helped me to live on his land and contact the organizations to improve the living standards of the displaced people." [32]

In some cases, this in-kind rent payment is then re-sold by the landowners in the commercial market for a profit. In other cases, landowners may act as gatekeepers that condition humanitarian access to displaced populations, demanding that humanitarian agencies designate landowners' own family or clan kin as aid beneficiaries. One humanitarian NGO staff admitted:

"...there are two types of registrations [of beneficiaries], one is called 'New Arrival Track' (NAT) and the other is "Additions". … If there are 'Additions', it is a must for the landowner to get at least one or two registrations. … in May this year, there was a registration of beneficiaries, and the owner of the land demanded to be given 5 individuals. We couldn't give him 5, but we gave him 2." [33]

The leverage that landowners seek to exercise over IDP populations often incentivizes them to eschew any kind of formal written agreement with IDPs to maximize the flexibility to extract more rent, evict occupants as they see fit, or assign even more tenants to occupy the same plot of land hoping to attract

[31] Federal Government of Somalia. *The National Durable Solutions Strategy.* (Mogadishu: The Federal Government of Somalia, 2019), 46.

[32] FGD 327. (Male IDP). Jowhar.

[33] KII 234, (NGO Staff). Baidoa.

even more aid.[34] At other times, landowners, collaborating with camp leaders, collude to discourage IDPs from leaving particular settlements so that aid may continue to be provided, reducing IDPs' mobility to find better economic opportunities in other areas.

More broadly, the general scarcity of salaried jobs in most urban districts, and IDPs' lack of social capital to access these jobs, creates large populations of income-seeking IDPs whose only option for livelihoods is daily wage labor with few benefits and social protections. Indeed, one reason why host communities are reputed to tolerate large numbers of displaced populations is that these populations represent a source of exploitable, cheap labor for menial work, such as construction, cleaning, and other blue-collar wage labor.[35] The section on Mogadishu in this report highlights several instances of clear exploitation of IDP labor by host community employers.

The precarity of IDPs' land tenure and their unpredictable incomes are a further driver of their marginalization and food insecurity. The tenuousness of their land tenure and the paucity of income sources often lead to decision-making that hinders their long-term ability to become more resilient. For example, IDPs often undertake coping strategies that can reduce their long-term well-being, such as using savings to purchase food, selling valuable assets such as livestock, and divesting from other important expenditures on health and education.[36] In addition, the possibility of secondary or tertiary displacement because of evictions often discourages IDPs from making investments to create a small trade or small business, even though owning a business or being self-employed is the most preferred livelihood method for many IDPs.[37] In fact, some IDPs are reluctant to appear to be too economically successful, fearing that landlords might demand more rent in exchange, or attempt to evict them to appropriate their business.[38]

2.1.4. Additional Dimensions of Marginalization

In addition to the aforementioned challenges, other cultural and physical factors that reduce a person's capacity to generate income also impact their capacity to access food. Furthermore, the barriers to accessing humanitarian aid or how individuals experience violence are not equal. All of the below factors have been found to generally weaken the food security of certain population groups.

Gender

"...as a Somali culture, women were not allowed to go to work, although these days women are filling the positions of men. Still, women have fewer skills to search for work because, in the first instance, they may not have learned any skills or been educated. It happens in most cases. They depend on men and wait for something from them and those who don't have the support of men, don't have the skills to

[34] Christopher Wade, "I want my land. You have to go." Understanding the eviction phenomenon in Baidoa. Norwegian Refugee Council, 2021, 44.

[35] Susanne Jaspars et al., Food and Power in Somalia: Business as Usual? (Conflict Research Programme: London School of Economics and Political Science, January 2020), 45-48.

[36] Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat 2022, *Listening,* 33

[37] Ibid, 34. These statistics are from a representative sample of IDPs covering Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo.

[38] Jutta Bakonyi. "The Political Economy of Displacement: Rent Seeking, Dispossessions and Precarious Mobility in Somali Cities." *Global Policy* 12 (2020), 12; KII 604, (Camp Leader). Hudur

search for jobs - hence no income, and it becomes difficult for her and her children to have access to food."[39]

Food security is often a gendered experience. While access to food is described as equal by respondents, access to employment and income are not. Gender roles in Somali households see men as responsible for sourcing employment and income, while women are the care providers, although it is important to note that this is not uniform. There are many examples where women work outside the household, and there are certain jobs that are largely done by women. For example, selling food produce at markets or working in domestic work are typically done by women. Similarly, in rural settings, women can be heavily involved in cultivating and herding. Nonetheless, research has found women, especially those from disadvantaged settings, are typically less educated or with higher illiteracy levels, restricting their livelihood options.[40] The findings from the PEA corroborate this, and they show how this, coupled with women's reliance on others for providing income and food, increases their vulnerability to food insecurity. As one respondent explains: "Women encounter challenges since they do not have access to jobs like men do, and widows with orphan children struggle to provide for their families in this district [Baidoa].[41]"

The prevalence of conflict has also increased the risks of gender-based violence towards women, particularly those living in displaced communities and who are thus seen by potential perpetrators as being unable to seek recourse to justice.[43] This is particularly the case for incidents of gender-based violence perpetrated by security forces.[44] Conflict and violence also have a gendered impact on food security. While gender roles in war and peace in Somalia should never be assumed,[45] men's general involvement in actual fighting can leave women with dead, missing, and physically or psychologically injured husbands. Furthermore, in Somali culture men are sometimes allowed to have up to four women as partners, with this often being tied to the economic capacity of the man and his ability to support each partner. Nonetheless, war, drought, and food insecurity can destroy the financial base, leaving more than one displaced woman reliant on a single displaced man. Indeed, women belonging to households in which the male head has multiple wives may be more vulnerable to food insecurity, especially if the women are unable or discouraged from pursuing their own incomes and rely on a household head whose economic resources are divided among multiple wives.

Women who are reliant on others for food access can be exposed to gendered forms of exploitation over resource access. One respondent emphatically explains that "women sometimes face violations such as sexual harassment, and if she resists, she may not get food aid or be registered."[47]As highlighted in other sections, there are power dynamics associated with the provision of food assistance to

[39] KII 426. (NGO Respondent) Kismayo.

[40] United Nations, Women and Horn of Africa Consultants Firm. Gender, Climate and Conflict Analysis in Somalia and Assessment of Opportunities for Climate Agriculture and Livelihood Opportunities for Crisis-affected and At-risk Women in Somalia. (Mogadishu, Somalia: UN Women, 2022).

[41] FGD 230. (Female Host Community). Baidoa.

[43] Human Rights Watch, *Here Rape is Normal: A Five Point Plan to Curtail Sexual Violence in Somalia*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014), 9 - 11

[44] Ibid, 28 - 32

[45] Judith Garner, "Beyond Principles" in *War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and al-Shabaab*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 239-250.

[47] FGD 431. (Female IDP). Kismayo.

vulnerable populations such as IDPs, and women are vulnerable to exploitation. Extant examples from existing research and from this PEA illustrate how women can be exploited in exchange for humanitarian aid services and when trying to access forms of employment. Other humanitarian agencies have noted incidents where aid is provided in exchange for sexual favors.[48] As this PEA later documents in the Mogadishu section, women IDPs are hired for manual labor, only for the employers to renege on prior agreements and deny wage payments. In both examples, women are exploited in order to pay for basic needs. Finally, respondents often portray the aid distribution sites as places with significant physical competition over access to resources alongside violent forms of crowd management. Consequently, women can be disadvantaged in situations where physical strength can dictate who obtains aid supplies.

Despite these significant challenges that render many women more vulnerable in Somalia, it is important to acknowledge the critical role they play in household economic affairs and in community social cohesion. In the absence of male household members who are killed during conflict, or injured such that they struggle to earn an income, many women have taken their place as household breadwinners: one estimate of *de facto* women household head status among IDP households puts the figure at between 68.9 and 73.2 percent.[49] Moreover, the patrilineal clan system in Somalia means that when a woman marries into a household of a different clan, she maintains her original clan ties with her father's clan, while simultaneously building ties with her husband's clan. This leaves open the possibility of women playing a critical role in building social cohesion across clans, as well as helping build bridging social capital across different groups.[50]

Disability

Anything that curtails a person's capacity to work and earn money will severely undermine their food security. Across the research, people with various physical or psychological impediments are described as some of the most vulnerable individuals in both host and IDP communities, with one respondent claiming that while "there are a lot of people who are disadvantaged, the disabled people are in the worst position...those families are in a terrible position because they can't even work to get food."[51] The disadvantages to living with a disability are aggravated by conflict, poor nutrition, and scant health services. The severity with which a person living with a disability is affected by food insecurity may be mitigated by the economic and social standing of the people they rely on. For instance, those who are better connected to clan members with more economic resources may be less severely impacted than those lacking such connections. Nonetheless, disability status creates substantial challenges for all affected, undermines a person's ability to access aid distribution sites and potentially transport food through camps and along streets with rough and dilapidated surfaces. In addition, disability status often renders a person very vulnerable to having the aid taken from them, or to experiencing physical violence, including gender-based violence, or exploitation by other community members.

[48] United Nations Population Fund. Overview of Gender-Based Violence in Somalia. Mogadishu: UNFPA, 2021, 10

[49] Lucia Hammer, Eliana Rubiano-Matulevich, and Julieth Santamaria, Differences in Household Composition: Hidden Dimensions of Poverty and Displacement in Somalia, (Washington DC: World Bank Group, 2021), 10

[50] United Nations Population Fund, Gender Equity: Hit or Miss in the Somali Population, (United Nations Population Fund, 2019), 25

[51] KII 115. (Youth Leader). Afgoye.

Youth

"The youth in our group are facing significant challenges in accessing food as a result of high unemployment rates."[52]

"Our youth are either engaged in farming, went to al-Shabaab, moved to Kismayo for casual daily loading work...while a few went as refugees for learning."[53]

Youth occupy a complex and sometimes contrasting position regarding food security. Their experience of marginalization intersects along the other lines of clan-based and gendered discrimination. Able-bodied IDP youth may have far greater capacity to engage in casual labor[54] than a peer who has a disability, or someone who is too young or old to manage the demands of hunting for and sustaining the labor available to an IDP. However, while across the study young people are often identified as having the strength to manage food shortages now, their futures and their capacity to build greater resilience moving forward are being eroded through a lack of education, training, and high rates of unemployment.[55] In this sense, marginalization is enforcing ongoing hardship and food shortages into the future, with scarce opportunities for any form of social mobility. Moreover, even this youth who have completed forms of tertiary education are often described as being unemployed or significantly underemployed.

"Young people are highly vulnerable to the ravages of war… Firstly, conflicts rob them of their intellectual potential, as they become followers rather than independent thinkers. Secondly, they are the ones who tragically lose their lives in wars. Lastly, their future in terms of education, employment, and overall well-being is severely compromised."[56]

Youth have age-based experiences of violence, something that is again gendered, and something that can significantly undermine their futures. For example, young girls and women are often subjected to (forced) marriage and bearing children at young ages,[57] taking away opportunities for them to pursue an education and pursue work, thus limiting future income-generating opportunities. Young men are often the most vulnerable to participating in violence, and this can relate to economic necessity, a need to please the clan-based social network[58] (essential for those future opportunities), and forced conscription.[59] In this study, people also describe how poor young men are often targeted and imprisoned *en masse* by the security agencies after bombings by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu and Baidoa.

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[52] FGD 626. (Female IDP). Hudur.

[53] FGD 431. (Female Host Community) Kismayo.

[54] "Casual" or "Menial" labor refers to low-income, insecure, often unskilled blue-collar work. In the context of the research areas, this could include portering, construction work, domestic cleaning jobs etc. This type of employment is often sourced on a day-to-day basis without any formal contracts or forms of job security.

[55] It is possible that continued unemployment and vulnerability, which are often experienced by youth IDPs, can have long-term mental health effects, such as creating a sense of hopelessness that might reduce motivation to seek employment. These in turn might render securing livelihoods in the future even more challenging. On the possible link between unemployment and mental health among war-affected Somali populations, see Francesca Riveli, A Situation Analysis of Mental Health in Somalia, (Mogadishu: World Health Organization, 2010), 20.

[56] FGD 432. (Male Host Community) Kismayo.

[57] United Nations Population Fund 2021, Overview, 12

[58] Judy El-Bushra *et al.,* "Between a Rock and a Hard Place", in *War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and al-Shabaab*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 275-284.

[59] Catherine Besteman and Daniel Van Lehman, "Somalia's Southern War", in *War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and al-Shabaab*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 299-308.

Conversely, young women are incredibly vulnerable to the emotional, physical, and social devastation of sexual violence, and respondents indicate how women's bodies can become part of the spoils of conflict, and in other cases, even demanded as tribute by dominant armed forces.[60] Again, such experiences would likely curtail the social and physical capacities they will need to access resources successfully in the future.

2.2. DISTRICT FINDINGS

The second part of the PEA findings examines how the dynamics described above play out in the specific districts where RFSAs are to be implemented, as well as any district-specific dynamics that appear to mitigate the sources of insecure land tenure and access to food for IDPs in particular. The following overviews of each district provide important insights into the district-level dynamics affecting the food security of marginalized communities. For a breakdown of district clan profiles, refer to Annex 5.

2.2.1. KISMAYO

Kismayo is the main city and current capital of the Jubaland State (JSS). With a population of 300,000, it is one of Somalia's largest cities and one of the country's most important economic hubs. Located in the south of the country, Kismayo has a significant regional seaport on the Indian Ocean and is situated close to the mouths of the Juba and Shabelle rivers and the fertile agricultural land surrounding those waterways. Kismayo's recent political history heavily defines the current sources and flows of power within the city and the surrounding district. It is a power base for the Darood clan family, and for the last ten years, the city has been controlled by Ahmed Madobe of the Darood–Ogaden clan lineage after his *Ras Kambooni* militia and the Kenyan Army defeated al-Shabaab and liberated much of the FMS by 2012.[61] The decade following Madobe's election as president in 2013 and his central role in the formation of Jubaland state saw the president consolidate significant political power, including exercising direct control over Kismayo's district authority and its political appointments. Consequently, the most influential roles in the city are held by members of the Darood clan family and its Ogaden, Mareexaan, Dhulbahante, and Majeerten lineages.

In contrast to the Darood, several clans are considered minorities in Kismayo. These include the Bantu, Dir, Rahanweyn (also known as Digil and Mirifle), and the Banjuni. In Jubaland, the Rahanweyn and the Bantu have sizable populations but lack political representation. In general, the minority or marginalized clans of Jubaland make up most of the IDP population locally. As with other districts, regular access to food for such populations is directly linked to steady access to income. However, access to a steady income is extremely rare, which is compounded even further because IDPs often lack the requisite social connections to secure well-paying employment.

Respondents describe better-paid vacancies being advertised openly and formally at times, but that the recruitment process is heavily influenced by clan connections, even for segments of the humanitarian sector: "It's mandatory for the NGO management to use the 4.5 clan system selection criteria because they want to implement a project and the project needs protection…through that process of the 4.5 clan-based system, the IDP youth, minority, marginalized and vulnerable communities will not get any chance for such job opportunities, and if they do, it's not more than 1 percent of the project."[62] In Kismayo, political power and economic resources are concentrated within specific clan lineages, while

[60] Ibid.

[61] Crouch and Chevreau 2016, *Forging Jubaland,* 4

[62] KII 423. (Business Leader). Kismayo

IDPs' access to land, income, and food is tenuous. This is further compounded by al-Shabaab's control of Jubaland's most fertile farming areas and the road systems connecting them to Kismayo, which further intensifies competition over available land.

Nonetheless, Kismayo is notable due to official attempts by the district and FMS government to regulate IDP land tenure agreements and to reduce inter-community tension around aid distribution. Much of this effort has been spearheaded by the Jubaland Commission for Refugees and IDPs (JUCRI), which was created in January 2015, with the personal backing of Madobe.[63] Indeed, this political backing by the dominant political power may be one important factor allowing JUCRI to exercise meaningful authority in working with displaced populations. Among its functions, the agency mediates negotiations between landowners and IDPs over tenure agreements and eviction requests.

Public Authority Oversight Over Distribution of Aid

Themes emerging from the PEA qualitative interviews reflect how the distribution of food aid is rarely sufficient to meet needs, and that it is vulnerable to the bias and interests embedded in the networks responsible for disbursing it. However, the interviews also indicate the existence of some practices to limit the potential for exploitation or diversion of aid. JUCRI and the local NGO sector are important actors in this effort. One respondent describes camp residents as having access to toll-free complaint numbers, which they can use to alert NGOs who will then investigate and relay concerns to the relevant authorities.[64] Moreover, JUCRI has requested aid agencies and distributors to divide relief between IDP and marginalized host communities; a response to both the latter's poverty and the violence that can erupt during the distribution of aid should the latter feel excluded.[65] Finally, respondents also report that their management committees have undertaken training administered by local NGOs and JUCRI, with a focus on developing camp codes of conduct and IDP protection issues.[66] In turn, these skills improve the ability of IDP camp committees to exercise oversight of camp affairs and mediate disputes, including during aid distribution. JUCRI also explained they now organize the appointment of camp leaders through elections, and this is part of their objectives to ensure camp leaders are effective advocates for IDP, and that residents are more aware of their rights.

Indeed, some IDPs from Kismayo demonstrate an enhanced awareness of their rights to life-saving assistance, as well as confidence that there are channels they can use to enforce these rights, something that is starkly missing in interviews with IDPs from other districts. For instance, in Istambul Camp, one of the city's most urbanized and well-established camps, respondents replied to questions about the diversion of aid from intended beneficiaries by stating: "In here no one can violate the rights of

[63] There is no clear answer on why such an initiative had the backing of the Jubaland president, though one might speculate that the Jubaland leader may have had incentives to court international allies and recognition of his rule over the newly formed state at a time when the federal government and political rivals in Jubaland strongly opposed Madobe's tenure as FMS president. The latter went so far as to collude with al-Shabaab to attempt to oust Madobe. More recently, competition between JSS and the federal government have continued, most notably leading to clashes in 2020 and tension between Ethiopia and Kenya, who supported opposing sides of the conflict. See Crouch and Chevreau 2016, *Forging Jubaland,* 4 and International Crisis Group, "Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia," *International Crisis Group,* July 14, 2020. Accessed December 14, 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b158-ending-dangerous-standoff-southern-somalia. In the case of JUCRI, its initiatives are said to be supported by major international donors such as USAID and UNHCR, which may present incentives for the Jubaland government to build goodwill and demonstrate its governance capacity by undertaking initiatives aligned with such donors' priorities.

[64] KII 426. (NGO Respondent). Kismayo.

[65] KII 418. (District Government Official). Kismayo.

[66] FGD 427. (Male IDPs); KII 402. (Camp Leader); KII 435, (IDP Camp Leader). Kismayo

others…people can report to anyone they feel like…there is a conflict resolution committee in the camp. The camp has a general chairperson and a security agency people can talk to."[67]

Istambul Camp has over 12,500 residents, and its size creates the need for governance structures that go far beyond the model of single camp managers. When it comes to aid, respondents describe "block leaders'' as a subsection of camp authority that manages registrations:

"Mostly the block leaders register the beneficiaries. For example, if I register this household today and the next day another organization provides food aid, I will register another household that was not registered yesterday, making sure that all people access the support equally. Since limited resources are provided by the NGOs we alternate the registration of the households in the block in turns, as all of them cannot be registered at once."[68]

This rotatory model of aid distribution differs from the vulnerable-first method that many respondents across this PEA uphold as the ideal mechanism to select aid beneficiaries. The efficacy of rotatory models warrants more careful study, but such a system might bypass favoritism and the flaws embedded in needs assessments that mainly rely on the discretion of camp leaders or local government officials, so long as IDP communities are aware of the selection mechanism.

Public Authority Oversight and IDP Settlement Rights

Efforts to regulate the temporary status of IDPs within Kismayo seem more advanced than in other districts in this study. Furthermore, IDPs understand themselves as protected by such frameworks and have some leverage within the system to protect their land tenure rights. JUCRI is the principal public agency mediating and regulating IDP settlements on public and private land in Kismayo, with disputes primarily occurring in instances of IDP settlement on privately owned lands. In the case of a private landlord requesting the return of land:

"The District Office and JUCRI together give a timeframe to the landlord, and they find an empty public land to relocate the IDPs to. They assign that land and the IDPs move. It never happens that a landlord asks IDPs to move within a short period. IDPs always settle lands temporarily with an agreement between the landlord and the government and that protects IDPs from forceful evictions."[69]

This is a message that is repeated by camp leaders, host community members, and clan elders.[70] Importantly, IDPs also appear aware that while they have no rights to land ownership, there are formal land tenure agreements that regulate their individual and settlement status with landlords, and that there is a recourse to a mediated agreement to vacate the land in a more orderly manner. However, the tension over land use and private ownership rights still exists, and manifests most clearly in the escalation of eviction procedures should an IDP community refuse to vacate:

"Some IDPs may refuse [orders to vacate] because they want to live inside the town where they have easy access to the services and may have some business opportunities … when the IDPs refuse to move after discussions with JUCRI, the first sanction is the stopping of food aid and other services such as

[67] FGD 427. (Male IDP). Kismayo

[68] Ibid.

[69] FGD 433. (Female Host Community). Kismayo.

[70] Refers to KII 402. (Camp Leader), KII 404. (Camp Leader), KII 407. (Minority Clan Leader), KII 409. (Majority Clan Leader), FGD 432. (Male Host Community). Kismayo

water from that camp...then, the District Authority and the Ministry of Internal Affairs may take the responsibility to move those IDPs from the land."[71]

Indeed, IDPs also seem aware that state violence ultimately underwrites their land tenure agreements and limited settlement rights in Kismayo:

"The case will be taken to courts and the court will settle the disputes by observing the landlord's documents and ordering the forced evacuation of the IDPs from the land...IDPs are not the real owners of the land…the result [of IDP refusal to heed court orders] may sometimes be death, forced eviction with physical harm, and many other problems."[72]

Despite formal regulation over IDP land tenure agreements and a managed process for vacating land, private ownership rights still trump a person's or community's claims for relatively stable residence, income, and services within the city. Importantly, at no point did any respondents suggest avenues that would enable IDPs to develop more permanent land tenure on private land.

The situation differs for public land. In Kismayo, there is a notable effort to relocate IDPs to public land in a town called Luglow, 18 kilometers north of Kismayo city. Each relocated household receives a 30 by 20-meter plot of permanent land to settle on, offering significantly more land security than is afforded to IDPs living on private land. The area around Luglow borders the Juba River and is thus well-suited for crop cultivation and livestock rearing. This creates potential opportunities for IDP households to meet food needs through home food production.[73] As of this writing, an estimated 9,000 IDPs are residing at Luglow, though only a few have been relocated to Luglow from Kismayo City, while the remainder have already settled in the area.

This relocation policy has both benefits and challenges for IDPs. Luglow being far removed from Kismayo district's urban core and its economy means that additional sources of income and access to government services are scarce. As a JUCRI official explains, "relocating IDPs from a place they have called 'home' for years can be challenging...the IDPs previously had small jobs to sustain their daily lives, but now they are left without any means of income."[74] Moreover, the potential for additional income through selling cultivated crops, as well as household dietary variety, is likely more limited as IDPs are discouraged from making long trips between Luglow and Kismayo city's main markets.

Indeed, the fact that Luglow is far removed from Kismayo city, and is thus less lucrative land for Kismayo's political and business elites, may be an enabling factor that rendered the relocation of IDP communities politically tenable for JUCRI and the district government. In this regard, the example from Kismayo highlights both the possible avenues for providing greater stability to displaced populations and the potential tradeoffs needed to implement such initiatives.

2.2.2. MOGADISHU

Since the ousting of al-Shabaab in 2011, Mogadishu has experienced relative peace and security compared to other locations. As the seat of the national government, a heavy presence of security actors can be found throughout the city's 17 districts. In addition, a plethora of national and international organizations in the aid sector maintain offices in the city. Being the main maritime trade

[71] KII 420. (Village Leader). Kismayo.

[72] FGD 429. (Female IDP). Kismayo.

[73] KII 418. (District Official). Kismayo.

[74] KII 435. (District Official). Kismayo.

center in South-Central Somalia, Mogadishu is also a center of economic activity, experiencing tremendous growth over the past decade. These factors render Mogadishu a highly attractive location for displaced populations to attempt to resettle, as IDPs search for areas with high degrees of security and livelihood opportunities. With nearly 1.5 million individuals identified as IDPs, Mogadishu hosts the largest IDP population in Somalia.[75]

IDP settlement patterns are not uniformly distributed across Mogadishu's districts. While all districts in the Banadir region host some IDP settlements, the vast majority are concentrated in Daynille and Kahda districts in Mogadishu's outskirts, representing 50 percent and 42 percent of all individual IDPs in Mogadishu, respectively.[76] The concentration of IDPs in two districts partially reflects the direct arrivals of new IDPs in recent years, but also an extended process of evictions and government crackdown on informal settlements from more central districts in Mogadishu over the past decade. Government officials in Mogadishu regularly claimed that sprawling informal settlements threatened Mogadishu's internal security environment, in addition to damaging the city's image. This has led to large-scale clearances of informal settlements around government properties such as the presidential compound, military bases, and major roads from central districts.[77] An inter-ministerial "IDP Relocation Task Force" in 2013 identified Daynille as the targeted relocation area, though comprehensive relocation protocols were not implemented even as evictions from central districts continued.[78] This has resulted in Daynile, and the adjacent Kahda district, experiencing sharp increases in haphazardly organized urban and peri-urban sprawls.

Analyzing Mogadishu's political economy across all districts requires more careful attention to the myriad actors and institutions in the districts than is possible in the brief treatment in this study.[79] Here, we focus on Daynile and Kahda as the districts hosting the largest displaced populations. Both districts are marked by intense competition between individuals and clans competing for land, as well as for positions of power in district governments. As with much of Mogadishu, clans from the Hawiye clan family exercise the most influence in the districts. In Kahda, the Shekaal clan is dominant, occupying many of the most important positions in district government. In Daynile, the Murusade occupy most of the important positions of power. In addition, the Abgaal clan exercises considerable influence and military power in both districts (and in Mogadishu more broadly) owing to their armed militias and occupation of important government posts, including the current federal presidency. In these districts, many of the marginalized are from the Rahanweyn clan family, whose clans are the most populous in the Lower Shabelle region surrounding Mogadishu, as well as Jareer (Bantu) populations who are historically discriminated against and dislodged from their prior residences in more central districts of Mogadishu.[80]

[75] CCCM Cluster Somalia, CCCM Cluster Somalia: List of IDP sites in Somalia, OCHA: CCCM Cluster, accessed November 5, 2023.

[76] Ibid

[77] Rift Valley Institute. Land Matters in Mogadishu: Settlement, Ownership and Displacement in a Contested City. London: Rift Valley Institute and Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2017, 81

[78] Ibid

[79] For excellent overviews, particularly as it relates to land governance, see Rift Valley Institute 2017, *Land Matters* and Joakim Gundel. *Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu*. Nairobi, Kenya: Pact and the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, 2020.

[80] Gundel 2020, *Pathways*, 28

Land Eviction Risks

While IDPs are often not parties to land conflicts between the other competing clans, they remain in a vulnerable position of being forcibly evicted from the land they occupy, all the more so as an estimated 98–99 percent of IDPs in Daynile and Kahda occupy private land, often without any form of agreement with landowners or only verbal agreements.[81] Among those IDPs who have more secure forms of land tenure (or more confidence in their land tenure rights), some have been more successful in developing service industries or business linkages with the wider Mogadishu areas. However, in the context of poor land tenure recordkeeping and dispute resolution mechanisms, this can amount to a pyrrhic victory: seeing IDP communities establish economic activities can draw the attention of (prospective) landowners, who in turn engage in land grabbing in anticipation of revenues from business linkages or returns on investment as land value appreciates.[82]

There is little recourse to dispute resolution in cases of evictions. Legal experts have noted that IDP land dispute cases are generally ignored by the Banadir court system,[83] which is unsurprising given that Kahda is among the newest administrative districts in Mogadishu and government services beyond basic security provision appear to be non-existent, as explained by the majority of respondents from Daynile and Kahda. It is important to note that ongoing clan conflicts in Daynile and Kahda among heavily armed actors reduce the ability of clan elders to peacefully mediate disputes, which is often their role in communities. Instead, a group's ability to threaten violence appears to be more important. In this context, for some IDPs, reliance on gatekeepers aligned with more powerful clans is the only viable strategy for protecting land tenure.[84] Nonetheless, for most IDPs, eviction is difficult to avoid once confronted by a landowner. IDP respondents were unequivocal: "IDPs cannot claim the right to the land if the owner asks for it…IDPs will not even get enough time to seek other places to move…the only solution is that the IDPs will have to leave."[85]

At the same time, there is precedent elsewhere in Mogadishu of community mobilization against and media exposure of illegal land grabbing, which in some cases successfully led to the prospective evictor backing down. For instance, a 40-year-old woman and medical doctor who had established a maternal and child health clinic in Mogadishu had successfully resisted land grab attempts by diaspora businessmen after mobilizing beneficiaries of the clinic and disseminating the case on local media.[86] The same study found that media exposure can be a potentially effective manner to guard against evictions. While this case study presumes close communal ties and an ability to network with local media outlets, it also suggests that more public visibility of illegal eviction attempts may be one strategy for protecting the land use rights of IDPs, especially in a large urban area like Mogadishu, where information from one part of the city may not automatically become known to residents elsewhere.

Access to Aid, Income, and Food

The relationship between gatekeepers and displaced populations in Mogadishu is complex. Extant research highlights that, because gatekeepers are often IDPs' first points of contact upon arriving in

[81] REACH. *Detailed Site Assessment – Daynile*, Mogadishu: REACH, 2022, 4; REACH. *Detailed Site Assessment – Kahda*. Mogadishu: REACH, 2022, 4

[82] Bakonyi 2019, *Political Economy,* 12

[83] Gundel 2020*, Pathways*, 27

[84] Ibid

[85] FGD 535, (Male IDPs). Mogadishu.

[86] Gundel 2020, *Pathways,* 15

Mogadishu, they play a critical role in securing some land to settle on and acquiring basic resources for survival in the early days of IDPs' time in a settlement. This is in addition to other services, which gatekeepers and camp leaders provide overtime, including security, representation in some dispute cases, and aid (by advocating on behalf of the IDP communities during humanitarian aid delivery). For this reason, IDPs generally have a positive overall view of camp leaders acting as gatekeepers, even if they lament the informal taxation that camp leaders impose on aid. Indeed, in some cases, strong emotional bonds develop between IDPs and gatekeepers, who are seen as almost family members of the IDPs. Yet, the reality remains that IDPs and camp leaders enter into a clientelistic relationship which can, in theory, be exploited. Moreover, Mogadishu's camp leaders and gatekeepers differ from other districts in that they are often not IDPs themselves. Where camp leaders in other districts tend to be displaced people who have over time developed the local connections and resources to manage IDP settlements, Mogadishu's camp leaders are often community members who have invested in land specifically to attract IDP populations or are appointed by local authorities to manage camps.[87]

In this sense, camp management takes on entrepreneurial, rent-seeking dynamics as camp managers seek to create wealth from IDPs' plight. Recognizing that camp leaders/gatekeepers can play the dual role of ensuring IDP welfare and seeking profit has led to at least one initiative to formalize Mogadishu's system of gatekeeping, including by providing them with training on effective camp management, and the formal certification of informal camp managers to increase transparency.[88] The extent to which such initiatives can be successful, and in other contexts where camp leaders may themselves be IDPs, is an area for future research.

The typical accusations that aid targeting in Mogadishu is biased or often diverted emerge from IDP respondents in this study. However, it is important to note that the lines between IDPs, as officially recognized by humanitarian agencies, and displaced urban poor appear to be particularly blurry. As discussed earlier, the current arrangement of informal settlements around Daynile and Kahda is a product of systematic evictions of settlements from central districts within Mogadishu. Bantu populations in Mogadishu are highly vulnerable and subject to discrimination and poverty. In this sense, the frequently used humanitarian targeting criteria, which respondents claim tend to prioritize recognized IDP settlements, might miss highly marginalized populations outside of recognized settlements.

As with other districts, limited income is the major obstacle to food access for displaced populations. Respondents were unanimous in stating that IDPs are less likely than even their host community peers to secure well-paying jobs with stable incomes, despite the large urban economy of Mogadishu. Once again, social connections, specifically clan connections, shape job seekers' ability to find opportunities in the district. That many displaced populations sold the lands and assets they once held in their place of origin under the market value[89] also means that many lack assets or savings they can use to start small businesses or secure loans. The consequence is that daily wage labor, which can be sporadic, is the predominant source of income for many IDPs. What is notable in Mogadishu is that the sheer size of the displaced population in Daynile and Kahda creates a large market of cheap laborers for local businesses, aggravating exploitative dynamics. Emboldened by IDPs' lack of recourse to justice and the availability of more laborers seeking work, employer malpractice appears to be frequent. While daily, irregular wage

[87] Bakonyi 2019, Political Economy, 10; Erik Bryld et al., Engaging the Gatekeepers: Using Informal Governance Resources in Mogadishu, Copenhagen: Tana Copenhagen, 8

[88] Ibid

[89] Rift Valley Institute 2017, *Land Matters*, 76

labor is the norm among IDPs in all the districts under study, Mogadishu respondents frequently highlight cases of employers blatantly reneging on payment agreements or negotiating draconian agreements for arduous labor:

"Recently, a woman of the host community that I wash clothes for refused to pay me [sic] the 4 dollars we agreed to. She was arrogant and despised me, but I don't know where to complain." [90]

"Employers force us to do a lot of work that [should normally] be done in three days but asked us to do it in one day. Employers in the construction sector pay us money that is not appropriate for the work. Only IDPs meet such challenges. There are no permanent jobs, only casual."[91]

While the creation of more sustainable livelihood options would likely be of significant value to displaced populations, these findings highlight that mechanisms to promote awareness of labor rights, as well as channels to report breaches of agreements, may be effective intermediate steps amid the continued reliance on casual labor among Mogadishu's displaced populations.

2.2.3. AFGOYE

The political and security dynamics of Afgoye, located in the Lower Shabelle region of Southwest State, are among the most complex in Somalia. Situated a mere 25 kilometers north of the national capital, Mogadishu, Afgoye sits on major roads linking Mogadishu with major population centers and markets in south and central Somalia. The strategic position, which Afgoye occupies on inland trade routes means that control over the district's institutions, and the attendant ability to levy checkpoint taxes along highways, are highly coveted resources over which political actors compete. As is the case elsewhere in Somalia, disputes over land tenure and land-based resources are often flashpoints for conflict. Afgoye's proximity to Mogadishu renders its land highly valuable, with prospective landlords vying to purchase land whose prices tend to increase sharply.[92]

These competitions over resources are exacerbated by the complex web of the clan and political interests in the district, as well as the involvement of national-level actors in local conflicts. The Rahanweyn-Digil, specifically the Geledi subclan, are the most populous subclan in the district and consider themselves the original inhabitants of Afgoye. In general, there are ongoing tensions or conflicts between the Geledi and clans from the Hawiye clan family—the Wacdaan, Abgaal, and Habar Gedir —whom the Geledi view as having a lesser claim to belonging due to their comparatively later migration to Afgoye from Mogadishu after the fall of the Siad Barre regime. The Geledi occupy the District Commissioner position at the time of writing, and they are the most populous in the district. Yet, they are often at a disadvantage in their ability to use force, and thus ability to secure resources, when compared to the Hawiye–Habar Gedir. The Habar Gedir are well represented within the Afgoye-based contingents of the Somali National Army (SNA), which often counts clan militia members among their ranks, as is often the case with security forces throughout Somalia more generally.[93] This reality

[90] FGD 357, (Female IDPs). Mogadishu.

[91] FGD 535, (Male IDPs). Mogadishu.

[92] Ahmed Aweis, Farhia Muhamud, and Mahad Wasuge. *Examining the Durable Solutions Capacities in Kismayo and Afgoye.* Mogadishu: Somali Public Agenda, 2023, 28

[93] Feldab-Brown 2020, The Problem with Militias; Williams 2018, Anatomy of a Failure

provides clans such as the Habar Gedir the ability to call upon clan kin in the Army to secure their interests against competing clans.[94]

The Hawiye clans in Afgoye similarly occupy important positions in the district government, including the two deputy district commissioner positions. At the same time, internecine conflict amongst the heavily armed Hawiye clans over land and the right to tax commercial activities further complicate the fault lines of conflict and frequently disrupt commerce and transportation. On the other end of the spectrum, Jareer populations and other Rahanweyn members (especially those from the Mirifle clan) as well as the Hawiye-Gaaljecel, face high degrees of marginalization owing to their inability to secure positions of influence or compete against more militarily powerful clans.[95] In this context, it is little wonder that minority clan representatives in this study (and one non-minority representative) were adamant that the district government is considered illegitimate by many.[96]

Land Eviction Risks and Processes



Figure 3: Verified IDP sites in Afgoye as of October 2023. Source: CCCM Cluster Somalia, Oct 2023.

The fierce competition over resources in Afgoye, as well as the continued prevalence of intergroup conflict, renders many communities highly vulnerable, especially among those who live on privately owned land. As a substantial share (48 percent) of Afgoye's IDP settlements lack any agreement to use land, and 41 percent of those that only possess oral agreements, the significance of eviction risks cannot be overstated.[97] This is compounded by the geographic distribution of major IDP settlements in Afgoye. As indicated in Figure 3, Afgoye's IDP settlements tend to cluster along the Mogadishu–Lafool–Afgoye main road, which sees high levels of daily traffic linking the capital city to major inland markets such as Baidoa. High levels of economic activity are likely correlated with more valuable land that private owners, armed groups, and other actors seek to capture, significantly increasing the risks of evictions.

The prospect of evictions, or even the possibility of being embroiled in a lengthy land dispute with landowners, shapes individuals' decision-making in ways that affect livelihood prospects. As with other

[94] In addition to the SNA, the police force in Afgoye is predominantly under the jurisdiction of the Somali national police force, not the state force. This further complicates the division of federal, FMS, and district jurisdictions, and renders effective governance even more challenging. Governance and Justice Group. "Justice Snapshot South Central Somalia." Governance and Justice Group. Accessed November 10, 2023. Retrieved from https://southcentralsomalia.justicesnapshot.org/federal-member-states/southwest-state/afgooye/

[95] KII 125, (NGO Staff). Afgoye.

[96] KII 107, (Minority Clan Elder); KII 108, (Minority Clan Elder); KII 110, (Non-Minority Clan Elder); KII 115, (Youth Leader). Afgoye.

[97] CCCM Cluster Somalia. *Verified Sites in Afgooye as of October 2023*. OCHA: CCCM Cluster, 2023.

districts, uncertainty over their ability to reside on a particular piece of land for the foreseeable future disincentivizes IDPs from investing in long-term income-generating activities or assets that may otherwise improve their livelihood prospects, such as investing in and starting a small shop or trade.[98] Some are even reluctant to begin constructing durable shelters, instead relying on flimsy plastic sheets for fear that they would be evicted and need to quickly move their shelters with them.[99] Indeed, several IDP interviewees suggest that humanitarian NGOs tend to provide fewer services, including the construction of sturdier shelters unless the potential beneficiaries have secured some kind of land tenure agreement with the landowners.[100,101] Finally, having more secure land use rights may afford settlers more flexibility to explore travel to other locations without fear of having their belongings removed *in absentia.* Given that most IDP and host community respondents claim that it is generally safe for them to travel in town, the need to monitor their place of settlement may be a considerable impediment to finding additional, or more optimal, economic opportunities in surrounding areas. [102]

One mitigation factor is that those facing eviction in Afgoye may be able to appeal for a notice period before leaving a plot of land, which would reduce disruptions to livelihoods and allow for time to look for alternative lands to settle.[103] While the exact notice time is not clear, and landowners typically still make the final decision on whether to grant the notice period, the norm appears to be consistent with the South West State's Urban Land Bill endorsed in 2019, as well as the National Eviction Guidelines endorsed at the federal level. Both policies contain clauses on providing adequate notice periods before evictions. There is little evidence that either policy has been effectively or consistently implemented.[104] However, solidifying this incipient norm of allowing evictees adequate time to prepare, as well as not evicting settlers when a head of household/representative is absent, may help mitigate concerns around sudden evictions. With time, these norms may be expanded to more comprehensive eviction prevention strategies, such as more systematic documentation of written land tenures and assigning multiple witnesses to the signing of such agreements.

Access to Aid, Income, and Food

The degree of political and social conflict in Afgoye means that social and kin networks take on a significant role in accessing resources. Respondents' descriptions of different living conditions of IDP settlements in the district provide a poignant illustration of this reality. Like elsewhere in Somalia, there is some evidence from both camp and host community authorities that camps whose leadership structures are better connected with government officials tend to receive more aid. An IDP camp leader in a major settlement said "we do not receive the aid that other camps [receive]…we have very little relationship with the local authorities…there are no active individuals who operate in the camp and

[98] FGD 127, (Male IDPs); FGD 128, (Male IDPs); FGD 130, (Female IDPs). Afgoye.

[99] FGD 129, (Female IDPs). Afgoye.

[100] Ibid.; FGD 127, (Male IDPs). Afgoye.

[101] Though respondents did not specify why they believe this to be the case, several possible challenges may confront aid providers when servicing displaced populations who lack secure land right agreements, including concerns about whether landowners or host communities might perceive more "permanent" shelters or aid as strengthening IDPs' claims to land over which they lack legal rights.

[102] One female IDP respondent even explained that having secure land rights in Afgoye would allow her to return to her place of origin and explore the possibility of returning on a more permanent basis, without fear of being displaced again while she was away. FGD 130, (Female IDPs)

[103] KII 109, (Non-minority Clan Elder); KII 106, (IDP Camp Leader). Afgoye.

[104] Indeed, the National Guidelines are non-binding. See Wade 2021, *I Want My Land*

connect the camp to the local authorities."[105] This account is further corroborated by other IDP and non-IDP sources.[106]

The practice of sharing food aid provided to IDPs with other actors is also pervasive in Afgoye. Gatekeepers, acting as camp leaders who advocate on behalf of IDPs, will likely demand a share of distributed aid, while payments to landlords as a form of rent are also frequently cited. Others claim that portions of aid may be claimed by local authorities, including the district government in collaboration with leading clan elders, even before any is disbursed to the intended beneficiaries.

It is worth noting that the distribution of in-kind aid in Afgoye tends to be a highly securitized affair. Due to the ongoing communal conflicts, as well as previous conflicts triggered at food distribution points, delivery of aid tends to be accompanied by a police presence and even occurs at the police station.[107] While this is intended to improve the delivery of in-kind aid, there is a risk that such public displays of local government, aid providers, and security forces jointly distributing aid deepens the perception among non-recipients that aid distribution is biased. This then increases the risk of future conflicts or hostility by host communities or other IDPs towards recipients. It may also discourage IDPs, who often already lack information about how humanitarian assistance should be distributed,[108] from expressing their needs or advocating for their communities, especially as security forces already have a reputation of being an amalgam of clan militias.[109] [110]

Beyond food access through humanitarian aid, the common challenge facing IDPs and other poor, marginalized populations is a lack of income to afford food from the marketplace. A 2018 survey of Afgoye IDPs found that limited economic resources were the most common challenge to accessing food, with 80 percent of respondents citing it.[111] Virtually all interviewees in our study corroborate this finding. In this regard, the results in Afgoye were consistent with other districts in that clan and social connections remain critical to securing good jobs with regular income. That the Afgoye district and its environs are primarily agrarian or pastoral areas means that many IDPs from these places of origin lack the technical skills that are in higher demand in urban areas, such as carpentry, welding, and electrical skills.[112] That many IDP communities rely on daily wage labor[113] may also mean that they have little time to spare in acquiring new skills, even if training resources were available. [114]

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[105] KII 101, (IDP Camp Leader). Afgoye.

[106] KII 107, (Minority Clan Elder); KII 108, (Minority Clan Elder); KII 122, (Village Leader); FGD 131, (Male Host Community); FGD 127, (Male IDPs). Afgoye.

[107] KII 125, (NGO Staff); KII 126, (NGO Staff); KII 122, (Village Leader); KII 119, (Village Leader); KII 103, (IDP Camp Leader). Afgoye.

[108] REACH. Comprehensive Site Assessment – Afgooye District. Mogadishu: REACH, 2018, 4

[109] One IDP representative claimed that police regularly beat "the poor people with sticks during the food distribution points" and that "if someone gets food without being beaten by the police, they are lucky." KII 103 (IDP Camp Leader). While it is unclear how frequently such incidents happen, the perception of police abuse of power during aid delivery may itself be damaging.

[110] Respondents largely recommend that any aid be delivered through mobile cash transfers or food vouchers in order to bypass actors who might otherwise claim a share. While this will likely still involve aid agencies working with local authorities in targeting beneficiaries, in Afgoye, this modality may have the additional benefit of avoiding the security concerns outlined above.

[111] REACH 2018, *Afgooye*, p.2

[112] FGD 127, (Male IDPs). Afgoye.

[113] REACH 2018, *Afgooye,* 2. FGD 127, (Male IDPs)

[114] There are indications of episodic spikes in private sector contributions to displaced populations, typically around Ramadan, through so-called *afurin* programs, with one study citing hundreds of thousands of US dollars contributed, as well as particular sympathy towards *maay*-speaking displaced populations in Afgoye who were evicted from Laascanood in Somaliland. Careful mapping of such contributors may lead to useful

2.2.4. BAIDOA

Baidoa is the interim capital of South West State (SWS) and the administrative headquarters of the Bay Region. It is located on one of the main Somali trade corridors, connecting Mogadishu and some of the country's most productive farming regions with Kenya and Ethiopia. It is also at the center of what was once described as the country's breadbasket, with important industries in sorghum production and livestock trading.[115] The surrounding countryside contains a patchwork of government and al-Shabaab-controlled areas, with their respective roadblocks restricting movement and increasing its cost. Politically, SWS is the heartland for the Maay-speaking Rahanweyn clan and its numerous lineages. In 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army ousted the Hawiye from the region, after which factions of the Rahanweyn coalition broke away to claim control over different areas of the state. The two most powerful subclans of the Rahanweyn, both in Baidoa and the SWS, are the Hariin and Leysan. While they have co-existed through a power-sharing agreement at district and state levels, this was disrupted during state presidential elections in late 2018, when Ethiopian forces collaborating with the federal government arrested the Leysan candidate, Mukthar Robow, and allowed the Hariin candidate Abdiaziz Mohamed 'Laftagareen' to take power.[116] The federal government's external interference in sponsoring the Leysan's political rival infuriated the clan and intensified the political competition between Baidoa's two most powerful clans, a competition which is likely aggravated again after the SWS parliament extended Laftagareen's term in office in late 2022 without a clear timeline for subsequent elections.[117] Competition for resources is thus fierce in the district, placing clans with significant political and military power, and those connected to such clans, at a distinct advantage.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Elay and Boqol Hore are often some of the most marginalized Rahanweyn in Baidoa, and their politically weaker position means that they are more numerous in the rural areas outside of Baidoa town, where access to municipal resources is lacking. Severe droughts, conflict, and Somali clan politics have led to Baidoa experiencing a large and expanding IDP population. Estimates from the UN's Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) mapping data give an IDP population figure of approximately 750,000 individuals.[118] A large proportion of these IDPs in Baidoa are from the surrounding areas and are indeed Rahanweyn themselves, with many belonging to the Elay and Boqol Hore lineages. Though the Elay and Boqol Hore view Baidoa as their ancestral home and the Harin and Leysan as guests, they lack the political and military power to enforce these claims. Thus, while they are connected culturally and linguistically to the powerful local groups, their continued treatment as outsiders in Baidoa contributes to their precarious social position within Baidoa's political economy.

Sustained advocacy by international and local humanitarian organizations has led Baidoa's district government to enact several measures to improve land security for IDPs and mitigate some of the

insights on potential partners in targeting highly vulnerable and marginalized populations in Afgoye, as well as providing sustainable livelihoods opportunities. Aweis 2023, *Durable Solutions Capacities,* 28

[115] Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit, *Livelihood Baseline Analysis Baidoa – Urban,* (Nairobi: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009), 5

[116] Christopher Anzalone and Stig Jarle Hansen, "The Sage of Mukthar Robow and Somalis' Fractious Politics," *War on the Rocks,* January 30, 2019. Accessed December 14, 2023. https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-saga-of-mukhtar-robow-and-somalias-fractious-politics/

[117] Somali Dispatch, "Laftagareen: the Parliament extended my term," *Somali Dispatch,* December 21, 2022. Accessed December 5, 2023. https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/laftagareen-the-parliament-extended-my-term/; The Somali Digest, "Opposition leaders of South West State push for regional elections," *The Somali Digest.* Accessed December 5, 2022. https://thesomalidigest.com/opposition-leaders-of-south-west-state-push-for-regional-elections/

[118] CCCM Cluster Somalia, *CCCM Cluster Somalia: List of IDP sites in Somalia*, (OCHA: CCCM Cluster), August 2023.

detrimental effects of resource competition. Notably, organizations such as the Norwegian Refugee Council have collaborated with government actors to document land tenure agreements between IDPs and landlords, as well as ensure that agreements are notarized such that witnesses can be called upon should future disputes around land occur.[119] Other notable initiatives include the 2020 municipal moratorium on evictions, which was primarily enacted to reduce the mobility of people inside Baidoa and thus prevent the spread of COVID-19.[120] In addition, the municipal government has earmarked a large publicly owned area called Barwaaqo, three kilometers east of Baidoa city, for the voluntary resettlement of IDP households and some host community members. Additional proposals for developing the site itself and the connections between it and Baidoa City have also been deliberated.

Relocations to the Barwaaqo site are being conducted in coordination with the International Organization for Migration, and approximately 12,000 individuals have moved there over the last three years.[121] However, as with IDP relocation plans in Kismayo, it is worth noting that relocation plans were implemented in land outside the most lucrative lands in Baidoa city; the stalled progress for similar relocation proposals for land in the more central Wadajir and Towfiiq neighborhoods of Baidoa city contrasts with the success of the Barwaaqo relocation plan, once again highlighting the potential tradeoffs between land quality and the possibility of securing land ownership for displaced populations.[122]

Profiting from Precarity

The general cross-cutting themes are relevant to Baidoa. Once more, IDP respondents explain hunger is shaped by high prices and insecure job opportunities, and, again, the quality of a person's social relations is emphasized as a primary reason for this. Compounding this further is a greater emphasis on the need for trust. However, beyond networking, what emerges in Baidoa is a conflicting image of IDP land rights and contrasting accounts over how aid is distributed. The political and governmental system dominated by locally powerful clans shapes opportunities and food access, leading to inequalities in the allocation of aid and resources to both marginalized host and IDP communities.

From both extant research and interviews for this study, an image emerges of how individuals and other entities profit from the precarity of IDPs in Baidoa. For example, in their study of the various actors in food aid distribution networks in Somalia, Jaspars and co-authors cite IDP and business respondents who outline how displaced communities are used to attract aid, while at the same time being excluded from it, as incoming aid is often taxed by landlords and camp leaders. The authors also report that public officials, NGO staff, and gatekeepers are all involved in this diversion of aid locally, summarizing respondents' sentiments with: "aid beneficiaries in Baidoa are few [sic] majority clans...those who are

[119] Wade 2021, *I Want My Land*, 64

[120] Ibid, 61

[121] Ibid, 66

[122] Our district mapping also suggests that the Harin themselves are heavily represented among those relocated to Barwaaqo, while the Leysans are not, indicating that the relocation plan may also be politically feasible for the Harin-led district and state government because it benefits clan kin. Indeed, this is perhaps not entirely surprising given that Barwaaqo also includes host communities in the settlement. While more comprehensive research on the demographics of this specific settlement would be needed to ascertain this claim more rigorously, the fact that IDPs from other Rahanweyn clans from the Mirifle-Sagal lineage refused to be relocated to Barwaaqo and sought their settlement land in Wadajir village suggests that it may be possible. See Wade 2021, *I Want My Land,* 34 & 66.

represented in the local authority and NGO staff...the aid system in Baidoa is corrupt, if you are not in the circle of local authority and gatekeepers, then you get nothing or less."[123]

In this study, several respondents describe some NGOs and businesses as being complicit in forms of aid diversion and rent-seeking. For example, some host community members describe corrupt food aid distribution "as government officials and international NGO staff [giving] the food to their close relatives,"[124] and some IDP respondents believe "the NGOs or the businesspeople do the distributions and don't give the food aid to the needy people...they only sell it to the host communities or give it to close family and friends."[125] Furthermore, a local official implies the existence of loopholes in the NGO and camp registration procedures:

"Everyone in the community who has a cousin in the aid agencies established his camp. So, the food aid agency calls that man directly without notifying the regional and district authority, and the food distribution team is sent to that camp and distributes the food to fake IDP households while the real IDPs are suffering from hunger in their camps."[126]

Finally, other IDP respondents claim, "it is not always the camp manager who takes the money [food aid fee]. In my opinion, sometimes the humanitarian staff will coerce the camp managers into collecting those shares from the communities."[127]

Moreover, respondents reiterated how clan favoritism can also structure the unequal distribution of aid locally. Firstly, the employment opportunities in the local administration are based on that system "if there are some jobs in the government ministries, they are divided by the different clans in the district through a system called 4.5 … since jobs are divided between clans through the 4.5 clan-based resource sharing system, I will not find that job if I am from a minority clan."[128] Furthermore, this approach not only excludes IDPs but also hosts communities that belong to minority groups:

"There are a lot of poor people and groups that have difficult living conditions, and no one is considering them. They are ignored just because they are not IDPs…The marginalized and minority clans have no one they can get assistance from. [While] for example, the poor people from the majority clans get help from their Members of Parliament who will support them by distributing food in their households."[129]

In Baidoa, the land also appears as a mechanism to profit from IDPs. Despite some potential mitigation measures described earlier in this section, the PEA research also details how IDP settlement can be used as a purposeful means to increase the value of private land in Baidoa while keeping land tenure agreements oral giving landowners the flexibility to evict the residents when the market conditions favor a high selling price for land.[130] While gatekeepers are cited as providing beneficial services and playing an important role in camp management, some are also involved in predatory practices to generate wealth from IDPs' precarity. These include splitting camps to quell dissent over malfeasance in

[123] Susanne Jaspars *et al*., *Food and Power in Somalia: Business as Usual?* (Conflict Research Programme: London School of Economics and Political Science, January 2020), 45-46.

[124] FGD 231. (Female Host Community). Baidoa.

[125] FGD 226. (Male IDP). Baidoa.

[126] KII 229. (Village Leader). Baidoa.

[127] FGD 225. (Male IDP) Baidoa.

[128] KII 212. (Women's Group Leader). Baidoa.

[129] KII 211. (Women's Group Leader). Baidoa.

[130] Wade 2021, *I Want My Land*

aid distribution or camp governance, encouraging the eviction of longer established IDPs and repopulating with newer and more needy individuals eligible for aid.

Overall, despite only being a small glimpse into IDP life in Baidoa, this study corroborates extant research on how individuals and entities sometimes profit from the precarity of IDPs in Baidoa. [131] The extreme vulnerability of the IDPs signifies they attract forms of wealth to the city through aid, and local authorities, entities registered as NGOs, and businesses can use this poverty to benefit themselves and their constituencies socially and economically.

2.2.5. HUDUR

Hudur, the capital of the Bakool region of South West State, is a city under siege. Though AMISOM and Ethiopian forces liberated Hudur from al-Shabaab control in 2014, the insurgents still occupy much of the surrounding rural areas and have imposed blockades on the major roads leading into and out of Hudur. This has led to the common refrain among Hudur residents that while the city is safe, traveling anywhere further than 5-7 km outside the urban outskirts is highly dangerous. Al-Shabaab activities have also stymied the delivery of supplies into Hudur, including food and humanitarian assistance. Land transportation into Hudur is costly and dangerous, which has often led to supplies being airlifted into the district to bypass rebel-controlled areas. Consequently, Hudur frequently experiences shortages of food supplies, and prohibitively expensive food prices, creating a dire economic situation for both residents and IDPs.

Hudur is thus not spared from the familiar crisis of limited government capacity to provide services for all community members and rampant food insecurity. Hudur also suffers from poor soil fertility and low moisture retention of cultivable land, limiting the district's capacity to produce food. The southern urban neighborhood of Horseed is reputed to be an urban poor enclave,[132] and the IDP settlements of Dhurshenshibele, Keyniga, Ceelberde, and Dondardiir (all on the peripheries of urban Hudur) are said to have particularly poor living conditions for inhabitants.[133]

However, Hudur is notable amongst the districts under study in that social cohesion and government capacity in Hudur appear comparatively higher than in the others. Hudur is the only district in this study that had successfully formed a District Council under the Wadajir Framework for Local Governance in 2017. Hudur's council is generally considered to be representative of the district's clans and subclans.[134] District Councils are intended to be more socially inclusive forms of local government, responsible for delivering services such as healthcare, education, and livelihood infrastructures.

When asked about services in their areas, host communities and IDPs could name government services provided in their areas, with several host community respondents specifically citing the Baxnaano National Safety Net Program as having worked in their area.[135] This differs from respondents from other districts, the vast majority of whom said that no services were provided in their areas. There have been instances where community members voluntarily contributed to government services, raising funds to

[131] Jutta Bakonyi and Peter Chonka, *Precarious Urbanism Displacement, Belonging and the Reconstruction of Somali Cities*. (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2023).

[132] KII 619, (Village Leader); KII 616, (Youth Leader). Hudur.

[133] Ibid; FGD 626, (Female IDPs). Hudur.

[134] Juuso Miettunen, *District Council Formation Lessons Learned Study*. Nairobi: Adam Smith International, 2020, 19

[135] FGD 626, (Female IDPs); FGD 625, (Male IDPs); FGD 627, (Female Host Community); FGD 628; (Male Host Community). Hudur.

support the rehabilitation of the Hudur district court and an airport terminal.[136] Respondents for this study also note that IDP-host community relations are generally cordial, and provide numerous examples of positive community interactions with IDPs, including lending supplies, providing food, and availing loans; allowing IDPs to shelter in their houses during al-Shabaab attacks around IDP settlements in the peri-urban areas; and even facilitating marriages with host community members.[137]

One contributing factor to these trends may be that the continued siege by al-Shabaab has created the perception of a "common enemy," and the collective suffering inflicted on the town's residents has necessitated mutual support behaviors to cope with the crisis.[138] Hudur's demographic composition may be another factor. The main clans in Hudur fall under the same Hadamo subclan lineage, while recent assessments highlight that the vast majority of IDPs, an estimated 94 percent, originate from the rural areas of Hudur district itself, while the remainder hail from the adjacent Tayeeglow district.[139] These demographic trends may explain why some respondents used the term "blood relatives" to describe relationships between community members. Taken together, these factors and the social cohesion they engender likely create an enabling environment for more effective governance.

The above findings do not imply that clan bias or rivalries are non-existent in Hudur.[140] Moreover, it is important to note that Hudur has a small population compared to the other districts, and is not located in major state or national centers of political power or economic hubs, which may lessen the intensity of resource competition among political and business elites. Nonetheless, these findings point to Hudur being a potentially fruitful context to pilot socially inclusive aid programs that are comparatively more ambitious than what is currently possible in more conflicted districts.

Land Tenure Rights and Dispute Resolution

An overview of Hudur IDPs' land tenure situation highlights the considerable risks IDPs face. Up to 88 percent of IDPs in Hudur reside in privately-owned land,[141] while an estimated 75 percent of sites lack any formal agreement to occupy land. Of those that do, all such agreements are oral, and none have an agreed end date to hold parties accountable to specific timeframes.[142] For this reason, nearly 20 percent of Hudur's IDP sites are at high or extreme risk of eviction.[143]

Despite the general lack of land tenure agreements and reliance on oral agreements for IDPs, respondents frequently assert that land disputes in Hudur are handled carefully, and with the strength

[136] KII 623, (NGO Staff). Hudur.

[137] FGD 627, (Female Host Community); FGD 618, (District Official), Hudur; KII 602, (IDP Camp Leader); KII 604, (IDP Camp Leader); KII 603, (IDP Camp Leader); KII 623, (NGO Staff); FGD 626, (Female IDPs); FGD 625, (Male IDPs). Hudur.

[138] Mydlak 2020, *Access to Justice,* 9; Consilient Research. *Access to Justice Assessment Tool Baseline Study*. Hargeisa: Consilient Research, 2022. [Unpublished report]. While this hypothesis has not been rigorously tested in Hudur, other research on the effects of exposure to conflict – and not being able to flee – on prosocial behavior towards other community members suggests it is theoretically plausible. See Michael J. Gilligan, Benjamin J. Pasquale, and Cyrus Samii. "Civil War and Social Cohesion: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from Nepal." *American Journal of Political Science* 4, 3 (2014). For a review of this literature, see Michael Bauer et al., "Can War Foster Cooperation?", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 30, 3 (2016): 249 – 274.

[139] REACH. *Detailed Site Assessment – Hudur*. Mogadishu: REACH, 2022, 2. This in contrast with other major urban centers, where IDP areas tend to be more "cosmopolitan" and host groups from diverse places of origin.

[140] The previous District Council election in late 2022 led to a shootout, as the incumbent commissioner, a man from the majority Hadame – Shirmooge, lost his seat to another Hadame subclan, while minority clans are seen to be the overall victor. Nonetheless, respondents generally describe optimism with the current government and describe community-government relations as cordial.

[141] Reach 2022, *Hudur*

[142] CCCM Cluster Somalia. Verified Sites in Hudur as of July 2022. OCHA: CCCM Cluster, 2022

[143] REACH 2022, *Hudur* 2022

of the evidence each party presents judiciously examined before final decisions are made.[144] For example, IDP respondents contrasted land dispute cases with other types of disputes which may have looser evidentiary requirements, while also highlighting the government's more active involvement in adjudicating such cases, "Land disputes are common to our localities because the town is growing, and many rural communities moved to the town as IDPs. They are solved by clan elders and legal institutions like formal courts, unlike other conflict cases which might rely on simple negotiations between parties."[145] "Local [District] Council members play an important role in the mitigation of land disputes. They support resolution teams to reach successful decisions." [146]

For IDPs whose best evidence is oral commitments from landowners, it is questionable whether they would be able to present a stronger case should a dispute arise. Nonetheless, these assertions that land dispute cases are won based on evidence are in stark contrast to how respondents in other districts, such as those in Afgoye and Mogadishu, explain the process of dispute resolution, in which they often argue that the IDP losing a dispute is a forgone conclusion. Notably, the mention of government actors in land dispute resolution suggests that the Hudur government can support the resolution of cases involving IDPs, rather than leaving land disputes to be privately dealt with between a landowner and an IDP occupant of land. Another respondent explained that the Hudur government actively trains IDP camp leaders and clan elders on effective conflict mitigation strategies for situations such as land disputes.[148] Respondents' frequent recognition of the importance of evidence in land cases suggests that there may be opportunities for humanitarian actors and local governments to protect land tenants from evictions. Formalizing written land tenure agreements and ensuring that there are witnesses during the signing who can later be called upon are strategies that have been successful in contexts such as Baidoa.[149] They may be equally beneficial for Hudur given the state's willingness and comparatively greater ability to adjudicate land cases in the district.

Access to Resources

There is widespread acknowledgment of the twin processes by which aid is ultimately delivered to non-beneficiaries. The first is in the targeting phase, where the local government may unofficially tax incoming aid supplies to be delivered. A common mechanism by which beneficiaries are chosen is for camp leaders to select a list of names of the purportedly most vulnerable in their camps and present this list to government authorities responsible for aid oversight, the District Department of Social Welfare.[150] It is generally unclear how camp leaders select these lists, or how local authorities select which sites to target at any particular time. However, there is a pervasive sense that some sites are more favored than others owing to their better relationships with the government. The second mechanism entails the payment of portions of aid to either camp leaders or landlords, in exchange for services or as part of the rent obligations: "Irrespective of what type of humanitarian aid support is received, the landowner will get his or her percentage, without compromise."[151]

[144] KII 617, (District Official); KII 618, (District Official); KII 619, (Village Leader); FGD 627, (Female Host Community); FGD 625, (Male IDPs); FGD 628, (Male Host Community); KII 605, (IDP Camp Leader); KII 604, (IDP Camp Leader). Hudur.

[145] Respondent 2, FGD 625, (Male IDPs). Hudur.

[146] Respondent 4, FGD 625, (Male IDPs). Hudur.

[148] KII 604, (IDP Camp Leader). Hudur.

[149] Wade 2021, *I Want My Land*. See also the Baidoa section of this report.

[150] KII 620, (Village Leader). Hudur.

[151] FGD 625, (Male IDPs). Hudur.

Respondents generally lament these practices and recommend that humanitarian aid organizations work more directly with communities. Several offered a more nuanced perspective, however, claiming that aid payments keep camp leaders accountable to the populations they serve, because they incentivize camp leaders to be more active in liaising with government authorities and advocating for their camps.[152] Another explained that some government officials are not paid regular salaries, and therefore treat aid packages as part of their remuneration.[153]

Both IDP and non-IDP communities struggle to find work that provides adequate and regular income. A handful of employment opportunities are ostensibly public facing, with job opportunities posted on websites, social media, Hudur's orientation center, tea shops, and other public fora. However, social connections that provide information about new employment opportunities or who can serve as references for prospective employees are still of paramount importance. While the interviews and extant research do not suggest the presence of discriminatory attitudes towards IDPs or minority clans per se, the competition for a limited number of well-paying jobs in the besieged city nonetheless means that those with better social connections accrue a significant advantage, while IDP and urban poor populations are left to search for alternatives. Casual wage labor options tend to fill this void. For many IDP and host community respondents, casual labor was the only realistic option for them, and the easiest to secure, even if sub-optimal.[154]

Like elsewhere in Somalia, lacking adequate income to purchase food is the main factor leading to food insecurity among households. In some cases, IDP communities may try to mitigate food insecurity by providing informal support to one another, such as by having multiple IDP groups live together and share the food supplies they have, or by donating to or raising money for others who appear to have a bigger need. [155] However, food availability is an additional major concern in Hudur, as the al-Shabaab blockade on the main town has led to a shortage of some food supplies even for those who can afford it. Indeed, the DRMS research conducted in parallel to this PEA demonstrates that Hudur's market is poorly integrated with other markets.[156] The scarcity relative to demand in turn leads to increases in commodity prices, further reinforcing the financial barriers against those most in need of food in the district.[157]

2.2.6. JOWHAR

Jowhar demonstrates findings that are less visible across the other districts in this PEA. The research suggests there is reduced pressure on land compared to more urbanized zones due to Jowhar's abundance of agricultural land. IDP camp eviction thus appears less plausible in the views of many respondents. Indeed, of the districts under study, residents of Jowhar claimed a much greater ability to exercise authority over land; around 78 percent of IDPs claimed they could, a proportion nearly twice as high as in Baidoa, the second-ranked district.[158] As a result, communities in Jowhar were significantly

[152] FGD 626, (Female IDPs). Hudur.

[153] FGD, 620, (Village Leader). This account is at least consistent with previous research conducted by the research team, which found that the payment of civil servants in Hudur can be irregular, with salaries released sporadically.

[154] KII 613, (Women's group); KII 604, (IDP Camp Leader); FGD 625, (Male Host Community). Hudur.

[155] KII 627, (Female Host Community). Hudur.

[156] Madden and Zhangalova 2023, *Market Study,* 15

[157] For humanitarian actors, this likely implies that some degree of in-kind aid will be necessary for the foreseeable future, as it seems unlikely that government initiatives or market forces alone would ensure an adequate supply of food supplies in Hudur.

[158] Madden and Zhangalova 2023, *Market Study,* 10

more likely to use the land they reside on for surplus food production; over 90 percent of IDP respondents in Jowhar claimed as much. The next highest figure is found in Baidoa, which is a distant second with around 25 percent of IDP respondents identifying surplus crop cultivation as one of their main income sources.[159] The PEA data from Jowhar reflects an IDP experience with greater settlement stability and community kinship, albeit one still marked by hardship and uncertainty over income and food access.

The district of Jowhar is located in the southeast of the Middle Shabelle region and its principal city, Jowhar, is the capital of Hirshabelle State (HSS). Situated 90 km north of Mogadishu, the district sits on the Shabelle River and is one of Somalia's most fertile agrarian zones. Together with its agricultural importance, Jowhar is strategically located on the main transport route connecting Mogadishu to the central regions of Somalia. These factors contribute to ongoing clashes between al-Shabaab and government-aligned forces across the rural areas of the district. The major highways south are heavily laden with government and militia checkpoints and susceptible to al-Shabaab ambushes and control. The roads north head into al-Shabaab-controlled territory.

Like all districts, the politics of Jowhar are shaped by the histories of local clan dynamics and conflict. The Hawiye-Abgaal have traditionally been the dominant group in the area, and they continue to hold significant political power. The president of Hirshabelle State is Abgaal, giving the clan control over political and security appointments. Consequently, many positions in the Jowhar district administration are held by members of the same lineage, including all the heads of the local security apparatus. Nonetheless, the District Commissioner is Shiidle, one group that collectively belong to the Somali Bantu or Jareer. The Shiidle are primarily agriculturalists, and the Abgaal are the most numerous clans in Jowhar. However, despite their numbers, the Shiidle have traditionally been forced into a relationship of servitude and marginalization by the Abgaal, a dynamic that saw them experience large-scale violence and dispossession after the Somali state collapse in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, in recent years, the Shiidle have become more assertive in demanding rights, clashing militarily with the Abgaal and gaining representation in district politics.

Currently, the Hawiye-Abgaal, the Hawiye-Gaaljecel, and the Shiidle have active militias in different areas of the district. Over the last year, Abgaal Ma'awisley clan militias have been arming to fight al-Shabaab alongside government forces. However, there are concerns over how this will impact local politics, weapons proliferation, and competition over resources, as the alliance with the government may empower armed militias over the long run.[160] Already, respondents have described the occasionally predatory activities of militias and armed groups, including providing backing to the members of clans who are monopolizing resources such as job opportunities, and taking a share of food relief before it reaches IDP communities.[161] While such militias have proven to be useful allies enabling the government to retake sizable swathes of rural territory, the long-run empowerment of these clan militias could aggravate power imbalances within the Jowhar district and reduce access to resources for communities lacking armed militia support.

The IDP population of Jowhar District is estimated at 27,000 across 23 sites and 3,600 households. Alongside minority clan members, many of the district's largest camps are heavily populated by Jareer-Shiidle. Respondents explain that "without employment, it becomes challenging to afford food, resulting

[159] Ibid.

[160] Somali Dialogue Platform, *Ma'awisley: A double-edged sword in the fight against al-Shabaab*, (Addis Ababa: Rift Valley Institute, 2023).

[161] KII 314. (Youth Leader); FGD 328. (Female IDP). Jowhar.

in food shortages"[162] affecting the majority of people.[163] Additionally, the detrimental impact of clan-based social hierarchies on accessing well-paid employment is pronounced in Jowhar city, and such opportunities are described as completely inaccessible to marginalized and displaced people, as "no matter how knowledgeable an IDP person is, as long as they are poor, people will never take them seriously."[164] Consequently, in the relatively small urban enclave of Jowhar city, displaced and marginalized people are left to survive by competing over limited and insecure menial work and charity.

Social Cohesion and Land Security

The rural experience of food insecurity and displacement appears distinctive to its urban equivalent in Jowhar, as well as other urban areas in this study. In the village of Bananey outside of Jowhar's main city, small-scale Shiidle farmers use low-skilled urban work and a seasonal cycle of debt to commercial food suppliers to subsidize agricultural production and food access. IDPs in those same vicinities attempt to exploit similar resources, albeit with impaired land resources, social connections, and levels of trust. Much of their access to resources takes on elements of informal customary arrangements, with the ability to farm the land, their settlement status, and the rights of landowners to ask for rental payments taking on alternative forms. Importantly, both the host and IDP communities in Bananey are predominantly Shiidle, potentially improving their willingness to support and respect each other: "the relationship between IDPs and the community host is strong. We maintain a good rapport with each other. Sometimes, the community host supports us with essential resources, and in turn, we also assist the community host when needed."[165] An example is how such support has resulted in agreements over farmland use that seem inconceivable elsewhere: "when we arrived in the community, we approached the community elders and expressed our need for a farm that can be utilized for production, generating surplus, and earning income. The community elders, in response to our request, provided us with a suitable farm to fulfill our requirements".[166]

Further evidence of this is that IDPs choosing to settle in Jowhar's rural areas are more likely to already have kinship connections with those living in Jowhar. This is evidenced in Figure 4, which depicts the percentage of IDPs in each district who claimed that one reason they moved to the location in which they were surveyed was because they already had family, clan, or other social connections in said location. At nearly 25 percent of all surveyed IDPs, the figure for Jowhar is notably higher than in several other districts and over ten times greater than in Kismayo.



Figure 4: Percentage of IDPs Citing Pre-Existing Clan of Family Connections as a Reason for Choosing Where to Settle. Source: DRMS Household Survey.

[162] FGD 327. (Male IDP). Jowhar

[163] KII 309. (Clan Elder Majority). Jowhar

[164] KII 312. (Women's Leader). Jowhar

[165] FGD 327. (Male IDP). Jowhar

[166] Ibid.

These social linkages and the relative abundance of land in Jowhar appear to mitigate the detrimental eviction dynamics often seen in other districts. Generally, and in Bananey in particular, the concept is framed as less probable and at times inconceivable. Indeed, IDP respondents for this PEA explain that they have never experienced or witnessed evictions. Importantly, respondents broadly indicate that there is less pressure on land around Jowhar than described by interviewees in more densely populated city districts. However, unlike government-led plans in Kismayo and Baidoa, as well as government mediation of disputes in Hudur, in Bananey the solutions appear more community-led. Although landowners do sometimes persist in evicting IDPs, the effects are generally mitigated through the intervention of clan elders: "elders always try to protect [IDPs] and try to talk to the landowner, but if he refuses, ...the outcome is [still] positive because there are many empty lands in this area and the elders and committees find other solutions [for the IDPs] by finding another piece of land".[167]

However, both host and IDP community members in Bananey, as in all other districts, acknowledge that the search for food remains a daily struggle. Farm produce is unpredictable due to changing yearly climates, with cycles of disease, drought, and flooding undermining crop production. Furthermore, both host and especially IDP communities sometimes lack the capital to buy seeds, and tools, and make improvements to the lands they are cultivating. IDP respondents depict experiences of failed crops combined with high food prices, and the unpredictability and difficulty of low-income work, leading to "a shortage of food primarily because employment opportunities are scarce and unpredictable."[168] Work is informal and is found through word-of-mouth or sometimes by chance, and female IDPs indicate their further vulnerability to significant changes by emphasizing, "We are illiterate and we only know how to work on a farm."[169] The kin-based nature of employment opportunities is still relevant for these IDPs: "when I obtain a job, I assist the elders of my clan, and in turn, they support me."[170] One particular local safety net is described as inaccessible to IDPs. Host community members explain that "during food shortages, we prefer to access food as credit from acquaintances and pay it back when it's harvest time."[171] However, for IDPs, concerns about their mobility and thus risks of reneging on loan agreements disincentivize similar food-sharing practices: "The shopkeepers in the local area will never lend to displaced people because IDPs [can] go whenever and wherever, so they cannot be trusted."[172]

3. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

3.1 CONCLUSION

Overall, this study outlines the politically rooted drivers of hunger and marginalization in south-central Somalia. In doing so, this Political Economy Analysis aims to support organizations implementing programs across the study area and enhance their capacity to improve the food security and resilience of the most disadvantaged communities. A crucial factor in achieving this is understanding the highly politicized context such resources are entering, ensuring this is navigated appropriately, and so enabling

[167] FGD 330. (Male Host Community). Jowhar.

[168] Ibid.

[169] FGD 328. (Female IDP). Jowhar

[170] Ibid.

[171] FGD 329. (Female Host Community). Jowhar

[172] FGD 327. (Male IDP). Jowhar

marginalized communities to be the primary long-term beneficiaries of the aid and development programs targeting them.

The central theme that has emerged from the qualitative research is the importance of social capital for accessing income, land, food, and humanitarian aid. Commercial food is mostly available in all the research sites, but IDPs and other marginalized groups cannot secure sufficient income to access it regularly, and it is social capital that shapes a person's capacity to source jobs, resources, and food. In a context of extremely weak public institutions and legal frameworks, these networks of informal personal relationships act as alternative structures through which information, opportunities, and social support flow. Crucially, such networks are significantly determined by clan-based affiliations, and the quality of these connections is informed by the state- and district-level dynamics of clan power. Put simply, clans or subclans with more political influence, or in some cases, a greater ability to threaten or use violence, are better positioned to secure valuable resources for their members. This shapes access to political authority and representation, income, aid, and the experience of food (in)security. Influential clan elders and family relations act as important referees and guarantors (linkages) for people aspiring to professional posts, accessing business credit, and buying and renting land or enforcing their land rights. Finally, the intangible asset of trust connects all of this, and being trusted or having trusted referees within the right social networks enables individuals to access opportunities and resources.

The research found IDPs and other disadvantaged and minority groups are largely excluded from these networks and have very weak social capital in the districts under study. IDPs are often disadvantaged because they belong to locally marginalized clans. Moreover, they often become removed from their social networks in their places of origin and/or relinquish their productive assets during the process of displacement. Consequently, IDPs and marginalized host community members across all districts often resort to irregular and menial wage labor, which are easier to secure than regular employment, but are often unsustainable and inadequate to become food secure. IDP access to humanitarian aid is sporadic and at times non-existent. Local clan politics influence distribution networks, such as by shaping which communities or individuals are proposed as eligible beneficiaries to aid agencies.

The critical role that clan plays in social life renders the social capital of IDP communities, especially their connections with members of the local authorities, paramount in determining who receives aid and how much. IDPs newly arriving to a particular district are described as some of the most vulnerable, as they have little knowledge of the local social context and job market, and it takes time for newly built camps to be recognized and registered by national and international aid agencies. This vulnerability is often further aggravated by gender, age, and disability considerations, with both biases against women and youth, and physical impediments limiting the mobility of people living with disabilities (as well as continued prejudice towards them) often creating significant additional obstacles to accessing income and so on.

Across the districts, land and aid are two of the primary resources that can be leveraged to both exploit and protect IDPs. Displaced people desperately need land to settle on, but often have no formal rights to do so, leaving them vulnerable to the whims of the people who control land. In the rare instances where land tenure agreements had been struck with landlords, these are often oral or lacking the level of specificity required to adjudicate important details such as tenure length, payment terms, and other pertinent terms and conditions. In the districts where the available land is largely private and agreements are poorly regulated, IDP land tenures are fragile and the value of IDPs appears largely defined by their potential to generate profit for landowners. For example, displaced people can be used to increase the value of land (as occupied land with some infrastructure tends to be more valuable) and

then evicted when land appreciates to a price at which the owner would like to sell. Furthermore, IDPs become sources of income as they use portions of the aid they receive to pay rent to landowners and camp authorities. The vulnerability of IDPs can even be used by landowners and camp authorities to attract more aid from humanitarian actors. These additional resources are often diverted locally—given to other communities who do not meet humanitarian aid targeting criteria, and/or sold off commercially for a profit.

In more hopeful examples, local authorities in Hudur and Kismayo are making efforts to regulate and arbitrate land tenure agreements, providing IDPs a modicum of rights enforcement and some security over their residential status. The PEA found nascent but promising examples of conflict mediation and camp regulation capacity-building for camp leaders in these same districts, as well as how this can improve the relationships camp residents have with camp authorities and the distribution of aid. In the rural IDP settlements of Jowhar, we found examples of social cohesion and host community support for incoming IDPs, including the provision of cultivable farmland for the latter through customary agreements. Finally, in Baidoa and Kismayo, projects are underway to relocate IDPs to publicly owned land and to give them ownership over the plots, albeit with the caveat that these lands are removed from urban centers and thus from important government services and economic linkages. Nonetheless, the success of such schemes is tied to how successfully they can ensure IDP access to the triad of land, income, and food, while owning land undoubtedly provides greater stability and ability to invest in productive assets or home food production, owning land without a means to generate regular income will still likely mean significant food insecurity.

3.2. Areas for Future Research

This PEA has aimed to provide an overview of the socio-political factors shaping access to resources for displaced and marginalized populations, as well as outline how these dynamics unfold at the district level. However, as the political economy of displacement in a conflict-affected setting such as Somalia is inherently complex, much remains understudied despite the research team's best efforts. Four areas for future research may be particularly fruitful, either as pre-RFSA context assessments or as part of general knowledge dissemination for the humanitarian sector writ large.

3.2.1. Motivations Behind Aid Diversion

The motivations and "targeting criteria" employed by gatekeepers such as landowners, district/village government officials, and camp authorities—local-level actors often implicated in aid diversion—remain understudied. While the PEA found that clan kin or extended family members can be added to beneficiary lists compiled and presented by such figures to humanitarian agencies, the underlying rationale for such choices is yet to be explored more specifically due to the broad scope of the PEA and the sensitivity of the topic. Some related questions that could be explored in future research include:

- Are such decisions made purely based on clan affinity?
- Are these decision makers simply privy to more private information about the socio-economic needs of kin, who are more socially connected to them compared to the needs of outgroups, and are thus simply less aware of the needs of outgroup community members?
- Is there evidence that these figures selectively target those they perceive to be the most vulnerable from *within* their clan groups, and if so, what are the heuristics they employ to gauge group members' vulnerability?

One study, albeit in a different context, tracked the distribution of solar lanterns in rural Kenya to measure the "leakage" of development assistance away from their intended beneficiaries. In tracking these patterns, the study found that those who ended up possessing the lanterns tended to be socially connected to village heads, a finding that would be consistent with this PEA's framework of how aid is diverted. However, the study also found that many of these households demonstrated significant needs, even if they failed to meet strict program eligibility criteria.[173] These findings suggest that some level of diversion may be driven by mismatched perceptions of need between local actors and humanitarian/development agencies, rather than simply due to avarice or prejudice. These are important questions to explore in more detail, given the critical role that gatekeepers and camp/local authorities often play in the targeting of beneficiaries and delivery of aid in Somalia.

3.2.2. Mutual Support Among Marginalized Groups and Across Groups

Throughout the PEA, respondents generally agreed that some form of mutual support from their group does occur, such as when a member of a neighborhood or block in an IDP settlement is ill and needed funds from those living around them, though these appear sporadic and *ad hoc* forms of mutual support and are largely insufficient to address most daily needs. Among international humanitarian actors, savings and loans groups (SLGs) are popular and important methods for building horizontal social capital among program beneficiaries, incentivizing savings, and mutual support, as well as pooling collective resources to support particular group members in need at various points in time. While such programs may be feasible among community members with more resources, the extent to which those most vulnerable to shocks and food insecurity would be willing, or able, to participate in these associations is unclear, and the PEA has found no evidence of such activities occurring among IDP communities. Indeed, some programs might graduate the poorest households into SLGs only after a period of asset transfers, coaching, and other support to ensure that they have adequate resources to partake in group activities.[174] Future research in the Somali context should explore what specific incentives and enablers are needed to encourage most vulnerable households to participate in such groups.

Moreover, the extent to which SLGs can be established to include, or bridge between, displaced and host community members, including whether adequate trust exists to sustain SLGs, remains an important research gap. While the PEA found that IDPs often struggle to secure loans from creditors from the district in which they have settled, it is worth exploring whether a mechanism for ensuring reciprocity could engender trust and willingness to collaborate across host community-IDP divides, a critical prerequisite to the establishment of SLGs.[175] Additionally, program implementers may explore

[173] Muthoni Ng'ang'a, Daniel Posner, Jennifer Hamilton, "Using iBeacons to Track the Distribution of Patronage Goods", Center for Effective Global Action, UC Berkeley, n.d.. Accessed November 20th, 2023. Retrieved from https://cega.berkeley.edu/research/using-ibeacons-to-track-the-distribution-of-fertilizer/

[174] Sadna Samaranayake et al., *Case Study 2: The State of Bihar's Approach to Economic Inclusion: JEEVIKA and the SJY Program*. (Washington DC: World Bank Group, 2021), 6 - 8

[175] It is important to note that even in the presence of cross-group trust, the requisite minimum savings amount to be accepted to SLGs may become a barrier to allowing the most vulnerable to join cross-group SLGs, if this amount were prohibitively high. At the same time, SLGs that are highly homogenous in the composition of their members, their risk profiles, and their economic status may mean that these SLGs may be highly vulnerable to the same shocks. The use of higher levels of aggregation linking SLGs across geographic areas, and thus, across geographies and populations with different vulnerability profiles, may be one mechanism to increase the participation of the most vulnerable in SLGs, while still reducing risk covariance. In the Somalia context, some prior research has highlighted the potential of associations among clusters of loan groups, implemented under the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) initiative. See Courtney Cabot Venton, Toscane Clarey, Nathaniel Calhoun, and Elie Losleben, Self-Help Groups and Resilience in Somalia: Supporting and Strengthening the SHG Ecosystem: Consultation Report, (Mogadishu: The Share Trust, 2019). Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/url?q=https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b2110247c93271263b5073a/t/5d115737ec47000001362ce8/156141

the extent to which assignment of members of different groups into SLGs as a precondition for some assistance, such as asset transfers, may be adequate to sustain those SLGs and build cohesion over time. Given that such activities may help create cross-group bridges that allow displaced populations to develop improved social connections within the district, this is an important area for further exploration.[176] While these activities can be explored with the objective of helping establish SLGs, the importance of fostering cross-group connections extends beyond SLGs, and should be considered as part of other types of economic, civic, and even recreational activities as well.

3.2.3. RETURNEES

Much of the study has focused on displaced populations who are living outside their places of origin. However, the realities facing returnees who were once displaced but have since returned to their district of origin have not been adequately studied. For example, returnees from the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya have often returned to Kismayo. While their pre-displacement social connections should, in theory, help them reintegrate rapidly, some research suggests that they face considerable challenges in their districts of origin.[177] They might live amongst family members in town, rather than in internationally recognized IDP settlements, which might render their needs difficult to assess for humanitarian aid providers. At a more local level, returnees who were displaced within Somalia but have since returned to their district of origin may also face different realities than IDPs living in an entirely new district in which they lack the requisite social capital to access resources. For example, an Afgoye camp leader in the Kulmiye settlement suggests that returnees to Afgoye can better navigate the district due to their prior experiences.[178] This is consistent with the finding throughout the PEA that increased social capital often leads to improved access to resources. However, a more systematic study disaggregating returnees from other displaced populations may provide a clearer understanding of their needs.

3.2.4. THE ROLE OF DIASPORA SUPPORT

Sizable populations of Somali diaspora living in Europe and North America, and extant research suggests that they play sizable roles in assisting non-diaspora who are affected by humanitarian crises such as droughts and conflict, including in helping some groups better cope with the 2011 famine.[179] Some respondents in the PEA also indicate that diaspora support had been critical in sustaining livelihoods for displaced populations, but such support appears unpredictable and episodic.[180] Much like local distribution networks for aid, diaspora support is tied to clan connections, with clans from the Rahanweyn clan family and Bantu populations said to have fewer connections with diaspora, and thus fewer sources of support.[181] A deeper understanding of how diaspora support is provided to displaced populations in the districts under study, how it is conditioned by clan and social connections, and what

7529541/Somalia%2BSHG%2BConsultation%2Breport%2BFinal%2BJan%2B28%2B2019.pdf&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1705689498394334&usg=AOvVaw0SV0KflrtuOy6hgAFQ7wiJ

[176] However, a cautionary case study from India highlights the importance of careful scaling of SLGs, as the process of scaling up such associations may lead to a decrease in their quality. For more details, see Garima Siwach, Sohini Paul, and Thomas de Hoop, "Economies of scale of large-scale international development interventions: Evidence from Self-Help Groups in India", World Development, 153 (2022)

[177] Ahmed, Mohamud, and Wasuge, 2023, *Durable Solutions Capacities,* 20

[178] KII 102, (IDP Camp Leader). Afgoye.

[179] Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination. *Diaspora Organizations and Their Humanitarian Responses in Somalia.* (Copenhagen: Danish Refugee Council, 2021); Jaspars 2020, *Business as Usual,* 33

[180] KII 627, (Female Host Community); KII 616, (Youth Leader). Hudur.

[181] Jaspars 2020, Business as Usual, 45

opportunities exist to pool resources that can be redistributed according to the beneficiary needs may create valuable additional pathways for displaced and marginalized groups to be supported.

3.3. CONSIDERATIONS FOR RFSAS

While more specific context and feasibility assessments in the districts and villages in which activities will be implemented may be necessary, this PEA suggests three general implications and considerations based on its findings.

3.3.1. SYSTEMATIC TARGETING OF VULNERABLE COMMUNITY MEMBERS

Reliance on local officials, community leaders, or camp authorities alone to inform the targeting of specific households for program interventions risks excluding those who are the most vulnerable if the information provided is deliberately or unintentionally skewed towards particular groups who may not meet program eligibility criteria. A degree of involvement for local officials and community leaders in the targeting and household selection phase can be beneficial, especially in helping humanitarian aid agencies contextualize poverty and vulnerability in each location, which may differ in important ways from the conventional assumptions held by aid providers and other outside parties. These are often done through participatory appraisals, such as participatory wealth ranking and social mapping exercises undertaken at the village level of intervention locations.[182] Through these methods, local leaders help program implementers identify the most vulnerable households in the community based on their contextual knowledge. Given the complexity of these geographic areas, additional measures to cross-check the results, including proxy-means testing and house-to-house visits of all settlements in an identified area and the administration of short quantitative surveys to identify household vulnerability, are strongly recommended. Should such methods be cost-prohibitive for populous areas such as Baidoa and Mogadishu, alternative means of triangulating information provided by local interlocutors should be identified and implemented.

3.3.2. ENGAGING BEYOND THE MOST VULNERABLE DISPLACED POPULATIONS

Engaging with local leaders and community leaders to identify vulnerable households has the benefit of increasing buy in to support an aid initiative, subject to the aforementioned caveat on the need to triangulate information. Beyond the targeting phase, however, there are additional steps that can be taken to reduce the misuse of aid resources or its diversion towards populations who do not meet the eligibility requirements of particular programs. Somalia is a highly challenging context for securing livelihoods and building resilience, even for those not considered to be the most vulnerable. There are likely other populations who have significant needs that are not adequately serviced by aid programs. Indeed, a common theme emerging from host community FGDs conducted for this PEA is that the targeting of aid often overlooks host community members who also have significant needs. As part of the initial community profiling and assessment exercises, it may be helpful to consciously identify vulnerable households in the host community who may nonetheless benefit from the graduation approach, or a less intensive variation as seen in the Rural Entrepreneur Access Program in Kenya[183] and

[182] USAID. Targeting Process and Methodology Report: Graduating to Resilience. USAID, 2019.

[183] Carter, M., Zheng, G., and Jensen, N. Clearing Pathways to Prosperity with a Livelihood Building Program in Kenya. (Davis:Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Markets, Risk & Resilience, 2022, no. 2022-02).https://bracupgi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/MRR-Evidence-Insight-2022-02-Samburu-midline-FINAL.pdf

the Government of Zambia's Supporting Women's Livelihoods program.[184] In both initiatives, the approach centered on a less intensive version of the graduation, meaning that beneficiaries did not receive the full suite of assistance typically offered under the graduation approach (i.e. consumption support, livelihood training, asset transfers, mentorship, and savings groups). Nevertheless, both initiatives led to notable improvements in program beneficiaries' incomes, savings, and food security, highlighting that even more "streamlined" approaches can yield substantial benefits.

Broader coverage of both IDP and host communities may reduce incentives for local actors to capture and divert aid resources by ensuring that aid is not overly focused on particular populations. Where program funding is inadequate to assist both the most vulnerable among IDP and host community populations, program implementers may explore the possibility of coordinating across different implementers to provide broader coverage. For example, implementers operating in Hudur may explore synergies with the Baxnaano social safety net program, which is operated by the FGS to provide cash transfers to poor and vulnerable households. Additionally, those working in Baidoa may consider integrating and layering their assistance with the implementers of the Barwaaqo resettlement initiative (the Baidoa district government and Norwegian Refugee Council, among others), which offers long-term solutions to displaced populations through combining cash assistance, access to land, and the formalization property deeds to reduce the risk of future evictions and relocations.

3.3.3. Land Tenure and Rights Are Integral to Resilience

The lack of secure land tenure and/or documented agreements for many displaced and marginalized populations creates important implications for households' ability to be food secure. For individual household members, the possibility of being evicted or displaced repeatedly disincentivizes them from making longer-term investments in the places they are settling, in turn leading them to not acquire productive assets that are better able to secure future income. In some cases, concerns about whether landlords would demand a higher share of their income discourage them from appearing too economically successful.[185] Moreover, it is possible that the fact that many IDPs lack secure land tenure, and are thus perceived as lacking firm roots in a location, also impedes the building of trust between themselves and host community members, who might be concerned that IDPs can renege on previous agreements by their (perceived) mobility and transience.[186] Consequently, to be effective, programs seeking to enable participants to secure sustainable livelihoods will likely need to be undertaken with interventions around securing housing, land, and property rights for marginalized groups. The specific strategies, or sequencing of strategies, will likely differ from district to district. The PEA has documented several methods or entry points based on data from each district: the allocation of cultivable, rural land through customary agreements (Jowhar); the allocation of public land (Kismayo and Baidoa); more systematic attempts at documenting notarized land agreements (Baidoa);[187] naming and shaming of illegal land grab attempts (Mogadishu); and strengthening norms around notice periods for removal of occupants from land (Afgoye).

[184] Botea, I, Brudevold-Newman, A, Goldstein, M, Low, C, and Roberts, J. "Supporting Women's Livelihoods at Scale: Evidence from a Nationwide Multi-faceted Program". NBER Working Paper #31625 (2023).. http://www.nber.org/papers/w31625

[185] KII 604, (IDP Camp Leader). Hudur

[186] FGD 327, (Male IDPs). Jowhar

[187] Wade 2021, *I Want My Land*

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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: DEFINITION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

While there is not one universally accepted definition of social capital, it generally refers to the resources and networks available to people and communities through their relationships in and between their different groups and social organizations. This refers to both the social connectedness of people and the shared values and norms that enable trust, understanding, and constructive cooperation between them. Nonetheless, while social capital can appear as normatively good, this study considers it value-neutral. This is because the social norms and principles that shape aspiration, cooperation, and connectedness are inherently cultural and contextual, and as a result, the form social capital takes may not always be advantageous, desirable, or considered ethical by all. Indeed, it can be a mechanism of exclusion for some. Consequently, for this study, social capital is also understood as intrinsically political.

Social capital is often presented in a model that breaks it down into the three scalar dimensions of *bonding*, *bridging*, and *linking*.[188] These refer to types of social relationships and connections within and between groups along both vertical and horizontal planes. *Bonding* refers to the bonds between people who belong to a homogeneous community, such as a tribal group or nation. It invokes a strong sense of kinship and similarity in terms of norms and principles, and significant relationships of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. *Bridging* continues to be horizontal, but it links people from one group to another across, for example, ethnic or racial lines, between language groups, or geographic boundaries. Bridging potentially connects people and communities to external resources, as well as alternative cultural identities and economic approaches. Finally, *linking* concerns vertical interactions and trusting relationships across formal or institutionalized hierarchical categories or grades of authority and power within a society. *Bonding* and *bridging* are between groups of similar social status horizontally, while *linking* is more formalized vertical connections across grades of social hierarchy.

While our study does not use the *bonding*, *bridging*, and *linking* framework explicitly, its frequent use makes it an important model to keep in mind. However, once more, we would argue how such relationships materialize in real life and are fluid and heavily informed by politics. This is especially true in the Somali context, where national, state, and district-level political and economic power is profoundly shaped by structures that favor specific clan identities over others. This is something directly connected to recent inter-clan conflict, clan-based differences in military strength, and the perceptions and *othering* that result from this. The current opportunities and obstacles people and communities have for effective *bonding*, *bridging*, and *linking* within south-central Somalia are configured by this reality. Consequently, for example, some communities may have the potential for constructive *linking* within certain states while others are largely excluded and blocked from doing so. Furthermore, the changing clan-based power dynamics of different states and districts means people from the same clan may have very different experiences of attempting to operationalize horizontal and vertical relationships from one place to another. Local conflict, environmental turbulence, and international geopolitics

[188] For example, see: Aldrich, Daniel P *et al*. "Social Capital's Role in Humanitarian Crises." (*Journal of Refugee Studies* 34, no. 2, 2021): 1787–1809.

Mercy Corps. Social Capital and Good Governance: A Governance in Action Research Brief. (Mercy Corps, 2017).

Frankenberger, T. et al. Community resilience: Conceptual framework and measurement feed the future learning agenda. (Washington, DC: USAID, 2013).

continue to shape Somalia's sociopolitical landscape, meaning the quality of social capital and connectedness is fluid and can potentially change quite abruptly.

ANNEX 2: DISTRICT CLAN PROFILES

KISMAYO

Kismayo Clans and Political Influence		
Dominant Clans:	Daarood-Ogaadeen Daarood-Majeerteen Daarood-Mareehaan	The major clans currently share power equally in Kismayo district and JSS. The Ogaadeen are dominant in Kismayo Town, while the Majeerteen and Mareehaan are more powerful in the surrounding countryside.
Other Main Clans:	Hawiye-Gaal Jecel Hawiye-Shiikhaal Hawiye-Oromole	The Shikhaal are the next biggest clan following the major three and hold an important position in the district. The Gaal Jecel have large numbers of humanitarian workers and business owners.
Minority Clans:	Bajuun Dir Jareer Bantu) Digil-Mirifle (Rahanweyn)	These clans have been less active militarily over the previous decades and have far less political power in the district. Nonetheless, both Bantu and Digil-Mirifle are relatively large numerically and their populations are growing as many of the returning refugees from Kenya belong to these groups.

Positions of Power and Clan Identity	
JSS State President	Daarood-Ogaadeen
Kismayo District Comm.	Daarood-Majeerteen
Deputy District Comm.	Daarood-Ogaadeen
Head of District Finance	Daarood-Mareexaan
District Intel. Head	Daarood-Ogaadeen
Police Commissioner	Daarood-Ogaadeen

IDP Population			
Kismayo	170 Sites	24,309 Households	145,225 Individuals

MOGADISHU

Mogadishu Clans and Political Influence		
Dominant Clans:	Hawiye-Abgaal Hawiye-Habargedir	The State President and Mayor of Mogadishu are occupied together in one role by the Hawiye-Abgaal. The Hawiye-Habargedir hold important security roles. However, the Habargedir break down into four further competing sub-lineages called the Saleban, Ayr, Sa'ad, and Sarur.
Other Main Clans:	Hawiye-Murusade Other Hawiye Darood	The Hawiye lineages are generally influential in Mogadishu. However, this comes with the caveat that clan power can change between the urban districts. The Darood were unseated from major political roles in Mogadishu during the conflicts of the 1990s. However, they still hold significant political and economic influence both locally and nationally.
Minority Clans:	Rahanwayn-Mirifle Rahanwayn-Digil Gaboye Shaanshi Asharaf Jareer (Bantu)	These clans are generally marginalized without influential political positions. The Gaboye traditionally occupy artisanal roles and are generally marginalized. The Jareer are marginalized across Somalia.

Positions of Power and Clan Identity	
Benadir State President	Hawiye-Abgaal
Mogadishu Mayor	Hawiye-Abgaal
Benadir Police Comm.	Hawiye-Habargedir-Saleban
Benadir Security Head	Hawiye-Habargedir-Ayr
Wadajir (Medina) D.C.	Hawiye-Abgaal
Wadajir Security Head	Hawiye-Murusade
Kahda District Comm.	Hawiye-Shiikhaal[189]
Kahda Security Head	Hawiye-Abgaal
Daynile District Comm.	Hawiye-Murusade
Daynile Security Head.	Hawiye-Habargedir-Ayr

IDP Population

[189] There is disagreement among the Shiikhaal as to whether they belong to the Hawiye or not. In this report we identify them as Hawiye-Shiikhaal with an awareness of that ongoing debate.

Mogadishu (Total)	975 Sites	304,606 Households	1,456,367 Individuals
Main IDP Districts:			
Mogadishu Dayniile	560 Sites	158,507 Households	732,970 Individuals
Mogadishu Khada	245 Sites	113,077 Households	604,590 Individuals
Mogadishu Hodan	55 Sites	14,209 Households	45,124 Individuals

AFGOYE

Afgoye Clans and Political Influence		
Dominant Clans:	Rahanwayn-Digil-Geledi Hawiye- Habargedir	The Digil-Geledi are the most populous in the district and hold the District Commissioner position. However, the Habargedir are powerful militarily and have an important business presence.
Other Main Clans:	Rahanwayn-Digil-Garre Hawiye-Murusade Hawiye-Wacdaan Hawiye-Abgaal	The Murusade, Wacdaan, and Abgaal lineages of the Hawiye are also influential politically and there is sometimes conflict between them. The Digil-Garre are one of the most populous groups in the district.
Minority Clans:	Hawiye–Gaaljecel Rahanwayn-Digil-Bagadi Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Elay Other Mirifle Shanta Caleemood Jareer (Bantu)	These clans are generally marginalized without influential political positions or the strength to compete militarily with the more powerful groups.

Positions of Power and Clan Identity	
SWS State President	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Harin
Afgoye District Comm.	Rahanwayn-Digil-Geledi
Deputy District Comm.	Hawiye-Wacdaan
Deputy District Comm.	Hawiye-Mursade
Head of District Finance	Rahanwayn-Digil-Garre
Head of District Army	Hawiye-Habar-Gedir
Police Commissioner	Rahanwayn-Digil-Garre

IDP Population			
Afgoye	41 Sites	7,051 Households	42,182 Individuals

BAIDOA

Baidoa Clans and Political Influence		
Dominant Clans:	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Harin Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Leysan	The Harin dominate the politics of South West State (SWS) and Baidoa. The Leysan recently lost the SWS presidential seat, but still hold significant power in the district.
Other Main Clans:	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hadamo	The Hadamo dominate politics and security in the neighboring Bakool (Hudur) region.
Minority Clans:	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Elay Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Geledle Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Reer -Dhimaal Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Moalin -Wayne Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Boqol Hore Jareer (Bantu)	The Elay are strongly represented in Buur Hakaba district, but are marginalized in Baidoa. However, both the Elay and Boqol Hore claim Baidoa as their ancestral home.

Positions of Power and Clan Identity	
SWS State President	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Harin
Baidoa District Comm.	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Harin
Deputy District Comm.	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Geledle
Head of District Security	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hadamo
Head of District Finance	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Boqol Hore
Head of District Army	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Leysan
District Intel. Head	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Harin
Police Commissioner	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hadamo
Attorney General	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Elay

IDP Population			
Baidoa	649 Sites	120,294 Households	740,065 Individuals

HUDUR

Hudur Clans and Political Influence		
Dominant Clans:	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hadamo -Shirmooge Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hadamo -Gaaljeel	The Hadamo lineages of the Rahanwayn clan family are the dominant clan in Hudur and the Bakool region generally, and the Shirmooge are the most powerful element in Hudur.
Other Main Clans:	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hadamo -Khamiisle Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hadamo -Galboore Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hadamo -Ligse Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Leysaan Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Luwaay Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hariin	The other lineages of the Hadamo are also influential locally. However, the Leysaan, Luwaay, and the Hariin are all well represented in district and state-level politics and security as well.
Minority Clans:	Rahanwayn-Moalin-Wayne Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Elay Jareer (Bantu)	These clans are generally marginalized without influential political positions or the strength to compete militarily with the more powerful groups.
Positions of Power and Clan Identity		

SWS State President	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Harin
Hudur District Comm.	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hadamo-Shirmooge
Deputy District Comm.	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Leysaan
Deputy District Comm.	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Luwaay
Secretary General	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Garwale
Head of District Security	Hawiye-Dogoodiye
Head of District Finance	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Jiroon
Head of District Army	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hariin
Head of District Intell.	Hawiye-Dogoodiye
Police Commissioner	Rahanwayn-Mirifle-Hadamo

IDP Population			
Xudur	76 Sites	7,266 Households	30,506 Individuals

JOWHAR

Jowhar Clans and Political Influence		
Dominant Clans:	Hawiye-Abgaal	The Abgaal has long been the dominant clan in the district. However, after a long period of conflict with the Shiidle, both clans now hold more equal shares of political influence.
Other Main Clans:	Jareer (Bantu) - Shiidle	The Shiidle are indigenous to Jowhar, one of the most numerous clans, and the original founders of the district.
Minority Clans:	Hawiye-Gaal Jecel Hawiye-Mobileen Hawaadle Baadi Cad Murusade	The Mobileen often align with the Abgaal. The Gaal Jecel are heavily involved in al-Shabaab but also hold key posts in the local administration. The Baadi Cad are also involved in al-Shabaab.

Positions of Power and Clan Identity	
HSS State President	Hawiye-Abgaal

Jowar District Comm.	Jareer-Shiidle		
Deputy District Comm.	Hawiye-Abgaal		
Head of District Finance	Hawaadle		
Head of District Army	Hawiye-Abgaal		
District Intel. Head	Hawiye-Abgaal		
Police Commissioner	Hawiye-Abgaal		
Attorney General	Hawiye-Gaal Jecel		
IDP Population			
Jowhar	23 Sites	3,612 Households	27,134 Individuals

ANNEX 3: METHODOLOGY

The methodology of the study is primarily qualitative, consisting of both key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). This is supplemented by an extensive academic and grey literature review regarding the political economy of marginalization, conflict, and food insecurity in Somalia, alongside a district mapping exercise detailing clan-based political power and the IDP populations in each district.

The qualitative data collection used KIIs and FGDs with a range of individuals capable of providing detailed descriptions of accessing food, income, land, humanitarian aid, and political power in their districts. However, these themes were largely discussed in relation to local IDPs and disadvantaged populations, and they also included questions regarding the governance structures informing IDP camp life, conflict resolution within and between communities, IDP camp eviction, and land rights.

The respondent types in all districts were male and female IDPs, male and female host community members, IDP camp leaders; representatives of local civil society youth groups, women's groups, and NGOs; minority and majority clan elders; local administration village leaders and district officials; and local business leaders. The table below provides a breakdown of KIIs and FGDs conducted, by location., and more detailed breakdowns of informant type by district can be found in Annex 1.

Table 1: Sample by number of KIIs, FGDs, and location.

Location	District Mapping	KIIs	FGDs
Afgoye	1	26	8
Baidoa	1	24	8
Hudur	1	24	5
Jowhar	1	26	5
Kismayo	1	26	8
Mogadishu	1	34	10
Total	6	160	44

LIMITATIONS

This study does contain two primary limitations. First, qualitative research is inherently localized and can never claim generalization. While the focus of data collection is to uncover rich data on social processes, and data analysis uses coding to identify general themes, meanings, and connections within this, qualitative data comes from a very small non-random sample, and therefore cannot conclusively claim generalization across the wider population. More research with larger sample sizes will be needed to draw firmer conclusions on the political economy dynamics of each district. Second, the security context

and sensitivity of some topics renders those topics possibly challenging to articulate in recorded interviews, or prone to social desirability bias. The research team has undertaken every effort to minimize such risks, including by assuring respondents of the confidentiality of their information, as well as using vignettes and hypothetical scenarios to avoid respondents needing to articulate personal experiences. Nonetheless, we encourage using a critical lens in reviewing the findings of this report.

ANNEX 4: KII RESPONDENT SAMPLE

KIIs	IDP Camp Leader	Clan Elder (Minority)	Clan Elder (Majority)	Women's Group Leader	Youth Group Leader	District Govt. Official	Village Gov't Leader	Business Leader	NGO Staff	Total
Afgoye	6	2	2	3	3	2	4	2	2	26
Baidoa	6	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	24
Jowhar	6	2	2	3	3	2	4	2	2	26
Kismayo	6	2	2	3	3	2	4	2	2	26
Mogadishu	8	4	4	4	4	4	0	4	2	34
Xudur	6	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	24

ANNEX 5: FGD RESPONDENT SAMPLE

FGDs	IDP Men	IDP Women	IDP Sites for FGDs	Host Men	Host Women	Communities around IDP Sites for FGDs	Small to Medium Business Rep.	Total
Afgoye	2	2	1 male & 1 female Canoole 1 male & 1 female Janaale (Afgoye)	1	2	1 male & 1 female Caanole 1 female Janaale (Afgoye)	1	8
Baidoa	2	2	1 male & 1 female Hanano 1 male & 1 female Salamey Idaale	1	2	1 male & 1 female Hanano 1 female Salamey Idaale	1	8
Jowhar	1	1	1 male & 1 female Bananey	1	1	1 male & 1 female Bananey	1	5
Kismayo	2	2	1 male & 1 female Istambul 1 male & 1 female Nasru-Din	1	2	1 male & 1 female Istambul 1 female Salamey Nasru-Din	1	8
Mogadishu	2	2	1 male & 1 female Xaqdhowar 1 male & 1 female Malable	2	2	1 male & 1 female Xaqdhowar 1 male & 1 female Malable	2	10
Xudur	1	1	1 male & 1 female Yowkoyow	1	1	1 male & 1 female Yowkoyow	1	5